Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have Our Cake and Eat It Too? by Mantel, Jessica L.
MANTEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2012 3:56 PM 
 
1393 
Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have Our 
Cake and Eat it Too? 
Jessica L. Mantel* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The health care debate has largely focused on the provisions of 
the Affordable Care Act (the ACA) aimed at expanding health 
insurance coverage to all Americans, most notably the individual 
mandate requirement.  The ACA, however, also takes important steps 
to address the companion challenge of making health care coverage 
affordable by reigning in health care costs.  These steps include 
various initiatives under the ACA that encourage the formation of 
accountable care organizations (ACOs)clinically integrated 
organizations of primary care physicians and other providers that, 
through various payment mechanisms, are rewarded for both raising 
the quality and lowering the cost of care provided to their patients.1 
Many believe that ACOs hold great promise for achieving cost 
savings given their financial incentives to do so.2  But proponents of 
ACOs do not simply contend that ACOs can stabilize health care 
costs; they also claim that ACOs can simultaneously improve the 
quality of care provided to patients.  Indeed, President Obama has 
identified ACOs as an important strategy for lowering health care 
spending while improving the quality of care.3  To support their 
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 1  Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395jjj(a)(1) (West 2012); see 
also Jeff Goldsmith, Accountable Care Organizations: The Case for Flexible Partnerships 
Between Health Plans and Providers, 30 HEALTH AFF. 32, 33 (2011) (“Some policy 
advocates believe that the way to stabilize health care costs is to engage providers in a 
form of population-based cost management—that is, to compel providers to 
constrain costs across the population of an entire community.”). 
 2  See, e.g., Anna Wilde Mathews, Can Accountable-Care Organizations Improve Health 
Care While Reducing Costs?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204720204577128901714576054 
.html. 
 3  See Letter from Barack Obama, President of the U.S., to Edward Kennedy and 
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claim, proponents point to entities such as Kaiser Permanente, the 
Mayo Clinic, Intermountain Health Care, and the Geisinger Health 
System, all highly integrated organizations that provide high quality 
care at lower costs than other providers.4  By encouraging other 
providers to form similar organizations, so the argument goes, we can 
check rising health costs without resorting to rationing health care or 
otherwise sacrificing the quality of care. 
So can ACOs really reduce healthcare expenses without 
diminishing quality?  Can we have our cake and eat it too?  This 
Article suggests that the answer is both yes and no.  ACOs clearly can 
reduce costs without sacrificing quality by trimming “fat” from the 
health care system and improving the treatment of patients with 
chronic conditions.  However, the opportunities for ACOs to achieve 
savings without adversely impacting patient care likely are far fewer 
than their supporters contend.  In the long-term, ACOs do not 
present a painless solution to the challenge of rising health care costs.  
If ACOs are to effectively slow down health care inflation, they can do 
so only by making some compromises in the quality of care they 
provide patients, including withholding potentially beneficial care 
from some patients. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part II describes the 
potential for providers to lower health care costs without diminishing 
quality through the elimination of wasteful medical interventions and 
better management of patients with chronic conditions.  Part II goes 
on to explain that the health care system, as currently organized, has 
limited capacity to realize these potential savings.  Part III explores 
ACOs’ capacity to achieve what the current system has failed to do—
achieving cost savings without sacrificing quality or rationing health 
care—and concludes that the optimism of ACO proponents is not 
 
Max Baucus, Senators, U.S. Cong. (June 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/the-president-spells-out-his-vision-on-health-care-
reform/ (stating that the President’s proposals to cut health care spending include 
encouraging physicians to form ACOs, which will also improve the quality of care for 
Medicare patients). 
 4  See DAVID NEWMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41474, ACCOUNTABLE CARE 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM 3 (2010) (“ACOs are 
modeled on entities seen as quality leaders in health care, such as Kaiser 
Permanente, the Mayo Clinic, the Cleveland Clinic, and Geisinger Health System.  
All of these exemplars are highly integrated providers . . . .”); Jenny Gold, ‘Poster Boys’ 
Take a Pass on Pioneer ACO Program, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 14, 2011), 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/September/14/ACO-Pioneers-
Medicare-hospitals.aspx (noting that the Mayo Clinic, Cleveland Clinic, Geisinger 
Health System, and Intermountain Health Care have been touted as models for 
ACOs). 
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without some merit.  Part IV cautions against viewing ACOs as a 
painless solution to rising health care costs, arguing that although 
ACOs clearly can achieve some savings without adversely impacting 
quality, there are limits to their ability to do so.  Part V concludes that 
in the long-term ACOs cannot successfully restrain the growth in 
health care costs without withholding potentially beneficial care from 
some patients, and urges health care analysts and policymakers to 
consider what regulatory oversight may be necessary to ensure that 
ACOs ration care in a fair and equitable manner. 
II. THE POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVED PATIENT CARE AND LOWER COSTS 
Most physicians and patients associate more medical care with 
higher quality care.5  After all, if you get what you pay for, spending 
less on health care implies lower quality care.6  Influential health 
policy analysts, however, present a more optimistic view, arguing that 
we can reduce the volume and intensity7 of care provided in the 
United States without adversely impacting quality.8  Although 
contrary to conventional wisdom, this position is not without some 
merit.  First, much of the medical care provided to patients is of little 
or no value, that is, it is wasteful.9  Eliminating wasteful care thus 
could reduce health care costs without compromising the quality of 
 
 5  See JOHN E. WENNBERG ET AL., THE DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY AND 
CLINICAL PRACTICE, TRACKING THE CARE OF PATIENTS WITH SEVERE CHRONIC ILLNESS: 
THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE 11 (2008) (“Most policy makers, physicians, 
and patients assume that more care is better care . . . .”); Elliott Fisher et al., Fostering 
Accountable Health Care: Moving Forward in Medicare, 28 HEALTH AFF. 219, 220 (2009) 
(emphasis in original), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/2 
/w219.full.pdf+html (noting “the widespread belief—often in the face of relevant 
evidence to the contrary—that more medical care means better medical care”). 
 6  See Caryl E. Carpenter et al., Issues of Cost and Quality: Barriers to an Informed 
Debate, 4 J. EVALUATION IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 131, 135 (1998) (noting that “[m]any 
Americans subscribe to a general maxim—you get what you pay for, including health 
care. . . .  Clearly, if quality of health care is defined in terms of quantity, then 
spending less will mean less quality.”). 
 7  The intensity of care refers to the amount and complexity of services utilized 
when treating a patient.  See DAVID MARCINKO, DICTIONARY OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND 
MANAGED CARE (2006) (defining “intensity to services”).   
 8  See WENNBERG, supra note 5, at 11 (concluding that expending more medical 
resources and providing more care generally do not yield higher quality care). 
 9  See id. at 4 (“[W]e waste on overtreatment in this country . . . . “); Donald M. 
Berwick, Thomas W. Nolan & John Whittington, The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Cost, 
27 HEALTH AFF. 759, 765 (2008) (“A mainstay of reduction and control of per capita 
costs would be yearly initiatives to reduce waste in all of its forms . . . .”); Carpenter, 
supra note 6, at 133 (arguing that our “cost problem” stems from the high cost of 
inappropriate care due to clinical inefficiency). 
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care.10  Many health policy analysts also argue that our health care 
system can achieve savings without sacrificing quality through better 
management of patients with chronic conditions.11  Specifically, they 
contend that improved treatment of chronic conditions can reduce 
medical expenses downstream by avoiding the care associated with 
preventable complications, such as avoidable emergency room visits, 
hospital admissions or readmissions, and expensive ancillary 
services.12 
Unfortunately, the health care system as currently organized has 
limited capacity to reduce waste or improve the management of 
chronic care patients.  In particular, incentives inherent in our fee-
for-service payment system result in a fragmented delivery system and 
promote both a higher volume and intensity of care.  Reducing waste 
and improving patient management therefore requires fundamental 
changes in how we pay for and deliver care. 
A. The Waste Hypothesis 
Experts contend that the U.S. health care system commonly 
provides care that is wasteful.  A diagnostic or treatment procedure 
may be judged wasteful because it is ineffective or unsafe, provides 
marginal or uncertain benefits, or results from medical error or other 
inefficiencies.13  The first categoryineffective or unsafe 
careincludes tests that do not provide useful diagnostic or 
therapeutic information14 and services that are not clinically effective 
 
 10  See LINDSAY A. MARTIN ET AL., INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, INCREASING 
EFFICIENCY AND ENHANCING VALUE IN HEALTH CARE: WAYS TO ACHIEVE SAVINGS IN 
OPERATING COSTS PER YEAR 2 (2009) (“[H]ealth care systems can indeed drive out 
waste, and thereby reduce associated cost, from their systems, while maintaining or 
improving quality.”).  
 11  See Bruce Fireman et al., Can Disease Management Reduce Health Care Costs By 
Improving Quality?, 23 HEALTH AFF. 63, 64 (2004) (stating that champions of disease 
management argue that improving the quality of care provided to patients with 
chronic conditions can prevent costly complications and exacerbations, thereby 
reducing hospitalizations and other costs).   
 12  See NAT’L QUALITY FORUM, WASTE NOT, WANT NOT: THE RIGHT CARE FOR EVERY 
PATIENT 2, 4 (2009), available at http://www.qualityforum.org/Publications/2009/07 
/Waste_Not,_Want_Not__The_Right_Care_for_Every_Patient.aspx (noting that 
emergency room visits and hospital readmissions could be avoided through better 
coordination of care and expanded access to primary care).  
 13  See Alan Garber et al., The Promise of Health Care Cost Containment, 26 HEALTH 
AFF. 1545, 1547 (2007) (describing wasteful care as care that “is ineffective, is 
delivered in an inefficient manner, or simply represents care of little value”). 
 14  See Peter Boland et al., Accountable Care Organizations Hold Promise, But Will They 
Achieve Cost and Quality Targets?, MANAGED CARE 12, 14 (Oct. 2010), available at 
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/1010/1010.ACOs.html (stating that 
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in addressing a patient’s condition.15  It also includes care that may 
provide some clinical benefit to the patient, but poses health risks 
that clearly outweigh any potential benefit.16  The second 
categorycare of insufficient or uncertain benefitsincludes care 
that provides only slight clinical benefit compared to the cost of such 
care,17 and tests and services where the clinical benefits to a patient 
have not yet been fully validated.18  The final categoryinefficient 
careincludes both duplicative procedures19 and tests and 
treatments that are more costly than alternative tests and treatments 
of similar therapeutic value.20  It also includes care provided to 
address either preventable complications or unnecessary harms to 
patients that result from medical errors or failures to implement 
protocols that reduce risks.21 
Many believe that eliminating wasteful care would produce 
significant cost savings without diminishing the quality of care.22  This 
so-called waste hypothesis is not without empirical support.  Through 
 
unnecessary care includes services that do not provide useful diagnostic or 
therapeutic information); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment and 
Medical Technology: A Critique of Waste Theory, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 778, 785 (1986) 
(“A technology is ineffective if it produces no discernible benefit to the patient.”). 
 15  See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The American Difference in Health Care Costs: Is There a 
Problem? Is Medical Necessity the Solution?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 13 (1999) (stating that 
a test or procedure is medically unnecessary if it is not appropriate or effective for 
addressing a patient’s condition); Berwick, supra note 9, at 765 (2008)  (asserting 
that wasteful care includes unscientific care). 
 16  See Mehlman, supra note 14, at 785 (“A technology or its particular use is 
considered unsafe, and therefore perhaps wasteful, when its risks exceed the benefits 
to the patient.”). 
 17  See id. at 784 (defining wasteful medical technology to include “technologies 
that do not yield adequate net benefits”). 
 18  See Jost, supra note 15, at 13 (stating that medically unnecessary care includes 
tests or procedures where the benefit to the patient is not known or not yet fully 
known). 
 19  See Boland, supra note 14, at 14 (stating that preventable ancillary services 
include duplicative procedures); Berwick, supra note 9, at 765 (stating that waste 
includes procedures, tests, and visits that represent rework). 
 20  See Mehlman, supra note 14, at 789  (“A technology might also be regarded as 
wasteful if it is expected to yield the same net benefit as another technology but at a 
greater costthat is, if it is not the most efficient, cost-effective technology to treat or 
to diagnose a patient’s condition.”). 
 21  See Boland, supra note 14, at 14 (explaining that unnecessary care includes 
“[p]reventable complications: [e]vents that cause unnecessary harm to the patient 
and cost to the system above and beyond the natural progression of an illness or 
injury”). 
 22  See Jost, supra note 15, at 2 (discussing the belief that eliminating waste from 
the health care system would save enormous sums of money, with perhaps the 
rationing of beneficial care not necessary to check health care costs).  
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their studies of chronically ill Medicare beneficiaries, John Wennberg 
and his colleagues at the Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and 
Clinical Practice have documented wide variation in spending across 
both geographic regions and hospitals.  Specifically, they found that 
patients in high-spending regions and hospitals visit physicians more 
frequently, make greater use of specialists, and receive more 
diagnostic tests, procedures, and inpatient care.23  Despite this large 
variation in the utilization and intensity of care, regions and hospitals 
with lower per capita spending generally achieve aggregate patient 
outcomes at least equal to their higher spending counterparts, and 
even score higher on many quality dimensions.24  Moreover, the 
variation in medical spending is not attributable to differences in the 
prevalence of disease or other population characteristics,25 but rather 
reflects differences in clinical decisions.26  These findings suggest that 
the volume and intensity of care provided to patients can be reduced 
without adversely impacting patient outcomes.27 
Studies that examine the appropriateness of certain care 
reinforce the Dartmouth researchers’ conclusion that a significant 
 
 23   See WENNBERG, supra note 5, at 13 (finding variation in utilization and 
intensity among geographic regions and academic medical centers). 
 24   Wennberg and his colleagues summarized their findings on the association 
between spending and quality as follows: 
[A]t the population level, our research and that of others has shown 
that more resources and more care (and more spending) are not 
necessarily better. Patient populations with similar chronic illness, 
followed over time once they become ill, do not enjoy improved 
survival or better quality of life if they live in regions with more care. In 
fact, the care they receive appears to be worse. They report being less 
satisfied with their care than peers in regions that spend less, and 
having more trouble getting in to see their physicians. The most 
surprising and significant difference between regions is that mortality is 
higher in high-spending regions. In other words, your chances of dying 
increase in regions where the health care system delivers more care. 
See WENNBERG, supra note 5, at 4.  Wennberg and his colleagues found similar results 
among high-spending and low-spending hospitals.  See id. at 54.  They hypothesized 
that the higher mortality rates observed in higher-spending regions and hospitals 
stems from the fact that most medical treatments pose some risk, and the more care 
a patient receives (particularly hospital-based care), the greater the risks.  Moreover, 
as care becomes more complex, with more and more physicians involved, 
miscommunication and errors are more likely.  See id. at 13. 
 25  See id. at 3 (noting that differences in the level of illness account for only a 
small fraction of the variation in the amount of care delivered). 
 26  See id. at 15 (hypothesizing that higher utilization results from differences in 
clinical decisions in the “gray areas” of medicine, with those practicing in areas with 
higher capacity showing a clinical preference toward greater intensity). 
 27  Id. at 12 (“Our studies consistently show that more resources and greater 
utilization of medical care do not result in better outcomes.”). 
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portion of medical care provided in the United States is unnecessary.  
For example, one recent study found that fifty-three percent of 
patients undergo an artery-clearing procedure following a heart 
attack even though research shows that the procedure offers no 
benefit and the national guidelines issued by the American Heart 
Association and American College of Cardiology state that the 
procedure should not be performed.28  Physicians also regularly 
prescribe antibiotics for pharyngitis (sore throat), despite research 
showing very little evidence of its effectiveness.29  Experts also 
estimate that at least one-third, and perhaps as many as half, of the 
seventy million CT scans performed each year are unnecessary.30  
These findings further support the contention that we can 
significantly lower health care costs without harming quality simply by 
eliminating wasteful care. 
Although estimates of the amount of wasteful care provided in 
the U.S. vary, most agree that it is substantial,31 perhaps as high as 
thirty percent.32  If correct, reducing or eliminating this wasteful 
medical care could yield significant cost savings, perhaps rendering 
unnecessary the need to ration health care in order to check rising 
costs.33 
B. Better Management of Patients with Chronic Conditions 
Many health care experts contend that improving the 
management of patients with chronic conditions offers a second 
 
 28  See Michelle Fay Cortez, Guidelines Don’t Curb Unnecessary Treatment for Heart 
Attack Patients, BLOOMBERG (July 11, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://mobile.bloomberg.com 
/news/2011-07-11/guidelines-don-t-curb-unnecessary-treatment-for-heart-attack-
patients. 
 29  See Jamie C. Brehaut et al., Do Physician Outcome Judgments and Judgment Biases 
Contribute to Inappropriate Use of Treatments? Study Protocol, 2 IMPLEMENTATION SCI. 18, 
21 (2007) (discussing overuse of antibiotics for treatment of sore throats). 
 30  See Melody Petersen, Over Exposed: The Startling Truth About CT Scans, GOOD 
HOUSEKEEPING, July 2010, at 144 (discussing overuse of CT scans). 
 31  See Robert A. Berenson, Shared Savings Program for Accountable Care 
Organizations: A Bridge to Nowhere?, 16 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 721, 721 (2010) 
(“Although experts dispute the exact amount of wasted spending, it is generally 
thought to be substantial.”). 
 32  See WENNBERG, supra note 5, at 4  (“Various estimates for the amount we waste 
on overtreatment in this country range between twenty to thirty cents on every health 
care dollar spent.”); Garber, supra note 13, at 1545 (“[S]everal broad strands of the 
health literature suggest that spending could be reduced by as much as 30 percent 
without adversely affecting health.”). 
 33  See Jost, supra note 15, at 2 (discussing the belief that eliminating waste from 
the health care system would save enormous sums of money, perhaps with the 
rationing of beneficial care not necessary to check health care costs).   
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opportunity for lowering costs without adversely impacting quality.  
Many Americans suffer from chronic health conditions such as 
hypertension, high cholesterol, heart disease, and diabetes, with 
more than a quarter of the population suffering from multiple 
conditions.34  These patients often see multiple clinicians,35 take 
numerous drugs, and may require frequent hospitalizations and 
ancillary services.36  Not surprisingly then, chronic conditions are 
expensive to treat and account for a disproportionately large share of 
health care spending, with as much as two-thirds of total health care 
spending directed toward the quarter of Americans with multiple 
chronic conditions.37  Reducing the intensity and volume of health 
care consumed by those with chronic conditions thus represents a 
primary target for those seeking to rein in health care costs.  In 
particular, experts argue that chronic-care patients often require 
costly care to treat avoidable complications, and that reducing these 
complications through better patient management would yield 
significant cost savings. 
Numerous studies have shown that those with chronic 
 
 34  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs.,  HHS Issues New 
Strategic Framework on Multiple Chronic Conditions (Dec. 14, 2010), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/12/20101214a.html.  Two-thirds of 
Medicare beneficiaries suffer two or more chronic conditions, with twelve percent 
having six or more chronic conditions.  See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
CHRONIC CONDITIONS AMONG MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES 10 (2011), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/TheChartSeries/Downloads/ChartbookFinal.pdf (based on 
2008 data). 
 35  See Jeff Luck et al., What is the Business Case for Improving Care for Patients with 
Complex Conditions?, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 396, 396 (2007) (discussing treatment 
of patients with multiple chronic conditions). 
 36  See ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., CHRONIC CARE: MAKING THE CASE FOR 
ONGOING CARE 12 (2010), available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/50968chronic.care.chartbook.pdf (“People with 
multiple chronic conditions have substantially more physician contacts, use more 
prescription drugs, and are more likely to be hospitalized each year . . . .”). 
 37  See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MULTIPLE CHRONIC CONDITIONS: A 
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 10 (2010), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ash/initiatives 
/mcc_framework.pdf (“The resource implications for addressing multiple chronic 
conditions are immense: 66% of total health care spending is directed toward care 
for the approximately 27% of Americans with multiple chronic conditions.”).  See 
generally CATHERINE CRAIG ET AL., INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, CARE 
COORDINATION MODEL: BETTER CARE AT LOWER COST FOR PEOPLE WITH MULTIPLE 
HEALTH AND SOCIAL NEEDS 2 (2011), available at 
http://asmdc.org/members/a76/attachments/IHICareCoordinationModelWhitePa
per2011.pdf (“Individuals with chronic conditions consume a high proportion of 
health care services; chronic conditions are expensive to treat and a major driver of 
increased health care spending.”).   
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conditions often receive poor quality care.  The Institute of Medicine 
has found that physicians often fail to follow recommended protocols 
when treating patients with chronic conditions.38  For example, 
although cardiologists generally follow clinical guidelines more than 
other specialists, studies have found that they only do so seventy 
percent of the time.39  These patients also see multiple physicians who 
far too often provide conflicting medical advice or prescribe 
incompatible or contraindicated drugs.40  In addition, chronically ill 
patients frequently do not receive the necessary support and patient 
education they need to ensure that they adhere to recommended 
medication or self-care regimens.41  For many patients, then, their 
chronic conditions are poorly controlled or go untreated, leading to 
acute complications in many cases.42 
The exacerbation of chronic illness often results in the need for 
costly care, including emergency department visits and 
hospitalizations.43  Experts contend that some of this care could be 
avoided through better management of patients’ chronic 
 
 38  See COMM. ON QUALITY HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE 
QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 10 (2001) (noting that 
despite the development of evidence-based guidelines for many chronic conditions, 
there exists tremendous variability in practice); see also Deborah Peikes et al., Effects of 
Care Coordination on Hospitalization, Quality of Care, and Health Care Expenditures Among 
Medicare Beneficiaries, 301 JAMA 603, 604 (2009) (“[C]hronically ill beneficiaries often 
do not receive treatment that has been shown to be effective for their conditions.”). 
 39  See NAT’L QUALITY FORUM, supra note 12, at 4. 
 40  See Luck, supra note 35, at 396 (stating that patients with chronic conditions 
are at risk of receiving potentially conflicting treatment strategies); Peikes, supra note 
38, at 603–04 (“Chronically ill patients often see multiple physicians . . . who may be 
incompletely aware of each other’s care, prescribe incompatible or contraindicated 
treatments, or provide conflicting advice.”). 
 41  See Bodenheimer et al., Patient Self-management of Chronic Disease in Primary Care, 
288 JAMA 2469, available at http://wmhcc.org/workfiles/mh_professional/Patent 
_Self-Management.pdf (discussing studies showing that physicians often fail to 
provide chronically ill patients with adequate information); INST. OF MED. OF THE 
NAT’L ACADS., LIVING WELL WITH CHRONIC ILLNESS: A CALL FOR PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION 
410 (2012), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13272 (noting 
that one reason for patient non-adherence is inadequate patient education). 
 42  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE ON DISEASE 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/59xx/doc5909/10-13-
diseasemngmnt.pdf (explaining the meaning of disease management). 
 43  For example, studies have found that chronically ill patients’ noncompliance 
with prescribed medication regimens leads to negative health consequences, 
including hospital admissions.  See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 38, 
at 410 (2012).   
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conditions.44  For example, asthma eventsthe leading cause of trips 
to the emergency room among teenagers—could be drastically 
reduced through better patient monitoring and adherence to 
treatment protocols.45  Similarly, proper management of patients with 
congestive heart failure (CHF) following their discharge from a 
hospital could significantly reduce the rate of hospital readmissions.46 
Not surprisingly, health policy analysts have long argued that 
improving the quality of care provided to the chronically ill will yield 
cost savings by preventing costly, urgent treatment.  The health care 
literature includes numerous examples supporting this position.  For 
example, several studies have found that chronic disease self-
management programsprograms designed to improve patients’ 
self-management of their illnessescan reduce the use and cost of 
health services.47  Similarly, CareSupport, a state Medicaid initiative in 
Oregon, yielded annual savings of $5,000 for each participating 
Medicaid beneficiary through better coordination of their care.48  
CareSupport generated these savings while maintaining or improving 
the patient’s quality of life.49  Executing similar strategies throughout 
the health care system thus has the potential to lower costs while 
maintaining or even improving patient outcomes. 
 
 
 44  See JACK MEYER & BARBARA MARKHAM SMITH, HEALTH MGMT. ASSOCS., CHRONIC 
DISEASE MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE OF PREDICTABLE SAVINGS 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.idph.state.ia.us/hcr_committees/common/pdf/clinicians/savings 
_report.pdf (claiming that interventions targeting chronically ill patients achieve 
savings through reduced hospitalizations and emergency department use).   
 45  See Boland, supra note 14, at 15 (2010) (noting that asthma events are the 
number one reason for teenage admission to the emergency room, and that most 
could be avoided with better-understood treatment protocols and mobile monitoring 
technology). 
 46  See Berwick, supra note 9, at 759 (“[W]ell-designed demonstration projects 
have shown for years that the rate [of readmission for Medicare beneficiaries with 
CHF] can be reduced by more than 80 percent with proper management of 
patients.”). 
 47  See Chad Boult & Erin K. Murphy, New Models of Comprehensive Health Care for 
People with Chronic Conditions, in LIVING WELL WITH CHRONIC ILLNESS: A CALL FOR 
PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION, supra note 41, app. B 285, at 293 (2012) (discussing chronic 
disease self-management programs). 
 48  See Douglas McCarthy & Sarah Klein, The Triple Aim Journey: Improving 
Population Health and Patients’ Experience of Care, While Reducing Costs, 48:1421 
COMMONWEALTH FUND 3 (July 22, 2010), http://www.commonwealthfund.org 
/Publications/Case-Studies/2010/Jul/Triple-Aim-Improving-Population-Health.aspx 
(discussing the CareSupport program). 
 49  See id. 
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C. Why We Can’t Get There from Here: Fee-For-Service and 
Fragmentation 
If simply eliminating wasteful care and better managing the care 
provided to chronically ill patients could solve the problem of rising 
health care costs, why have we not already done so?  The answer lies 
in large part with the current manner in which we pay for carefee-
for-service.  As described below, the incentives inherent in fee-for-
service promote high volume and high intensity care, discourage 
efficient practices, and promote a fragmented system lacking a 
coordinated approach to patient care. 
Unlike most other goods and services, medical care generally is 
paid for by health insurers, government insurance programs, and 
employers, rather than the consumer-patient.50  Insulated from the 
full cost of their medical care, patients have little incentive to 
consider the cost of such care.  Many patients then expect their 
health care providers to provide all medical care of potential benefit, 
no matter how slight the potential benefit or costly the care.51  
Physicians and other health care professionals, in turn, not only are 
trained to “do everything possible to help patients,”52 but also have 
strong economic incentives to satisfy their patients’ demands.53 
The manner in which payors reimburse physicians and other 
health care providers further encourages the high rates of utilization.  
Both private and public payors typically pay for their enrollees’ health 
care on a fee-for-service basis, with providers receiving a separate 
payment for each unit of service they provide.54  Basing providers’ 
 
 50  See D. ANDREW AUSTIN & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34101, 
DOES PRICE TRANSPARENCY IMPROVE MARKET EFFICIENCY?  IMPLICATIONS OF EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE IN OTHER MARKETS FOR THE HEALTH SECTOR 910 (2008) (explaining that 
hospital care and other care for complicated episodes is mostly paid for by public 
health programs and private insurers). 
 51  See Jost, supra note 15, at 15 (“[I]f the questioned test or procedure is likely to 
be of any benefit, the informed patient may expect or demand it.”); Jerry L. Mashaw 
& Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and Reforming Fraud, Waste, and 
Abuse in Healthcare Spending, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 458 (“The reliance on third-party 
payments to finance medical care strengthens patients’ own bias towards using 
whatever methods are available when their health is at stake.”). 
 52  See Mehlman, supra note 14, at 781.   
 53  See Gloria Bazzoli, Medical Service Risk and the Evolution of Provider Compensation 
Arrangements, in UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF 
HEALTH CARE 144 (Peter Hammer et al., eds., 2003) (“[I]f physicians seek profit like 
other economic actors, they will satisfy patient demands under fee-for-service 
payment because it holds potential for increasing their income.”). 
 54  See Harold D. Miller, From Volume to Value: Better Ways to Pay for Health Care, 28 
HEALTH AFF. 1418, 1419 (2009), available at 
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payment on the quantity, and not the quality, of care rewards the 
excessive provision of medical care.55  Physicians, for example, can 
increase their incomes by encouraging repeat office visits or 
otherwise increasing the supply of services they provide their 
patients.56  Indeed, empirical studies have documented that 
physicians paid on a fee-for-service basis provide more care to their 
patients than physicians paid under alternative payment models, such 
as capitation or salary.57  Hospitals similarly can increase their 
 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/5/1418.full.pdf+html (defining fee-for-
service as paying providers a predetermined amount for each discrete service 
provided).  As the term is used in this Article, however, it also includes a separate 
payment to a provider for bundled services, such as payments to a provider on a per 
diem or per episode basis.  A per diem payment involves paying an institutional 
provider, such as a hospice provider, a single, fixed payment for each day of care it 
provides to a patient, whereas institutional providers paid on a per episode payment 
receive a single, lump sum payment that covers all care provided during a relatively 
continuous episode of care.  See ANNE B. CASTO & ELIZABETH LAYMAN, AM. HEALTH 
INFO. MGMT. ASSOC., PRINCIPLES OF HEALTHCARE REIMBURSEMENT 7, 9 (2006), available 
at http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/documents/ahima/bok1 
_030575.pdf.  Like fee-for-service, per diem and per episode payment methodologies 
give providers incentives to provide more treatments.  For example, although 
providers paid on a per diem basis have incentives to lower the cost care provided in 
a single day, they have incentives to increase the duration of care as well as the 
number of patients receiving care.  See I.H. Monrad Aas, Incentives and Financing 
Methods, 34 HEALTH POL’Y 205, 20910 (1995) (stating that per diem rates for 
hospitals, while resulting in lower average costs per day, can stimulate use of hospitals 
and prolongation of hospital stays, thereby potentially leading to higher total costs); 
Marc Jegers et al., A Typology for Provider Payment Systems in Health Care, 60 HEALTH 
POL’Y 255, 265 (2002), available at http://hamahangi.behdasht.gov.ir/uploads/291 
_1628_Typology%20of%20Payment.pdf (noting that paying New Jersey hospitals on 
a per diem basis lowered costs per diem, but the average length of stay per patient 
increased).  Similarly, providers paid on a per episode basis have incentives to 
increase revenues by treating more cases, even though they have incentives to 
control the cost of cost of individual cases.  See Miller, supra, at 1419–20 (comparing 
the financial incentives inherent in various payment methodologies). 
 55  See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REWARDING PROVIDER PERFORMANCE: 
ALIGNING INCENTIVES IN MEDICARE 2526 (2007) (discussing the incentives of the 
Medicare fee-for-service payment system that result in overutilization); Miller, supra 
note 54, at 1418 (“Physicians, hospitals, and other providers gain increased revenues 
and profits by delivering more services to more people . . . .”); Arnold S. Relman, 
Doctors as the Key to Health Care Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1225, 1225 (2009), 
available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0907925 (“Most doctors 
are paid on a fee-for-service basis, which is a strong financial incentive for them to 
maximize the elective services  they provide[,] . . . a major factor in driving up 
medical expenditures.”). 
 56  See Bazzoli, supra note 53, at 144 (“[A]s the agent for a patient, a physician will 
increase the supply of services as long as his or her marginal reimbursement exceeds 
marginal costs . . . .”).   
 57  See Robert Town et al., Market Power and Contract Form: Evidence from Physician 
Group Practices, 11 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. ECON. 115, 131 (2011) (“Numerous 
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revenues by admitting more patients or expanding their services.58  
Fee-for-service thus encourages the provision of care of marginal or 
uncertain benefits, as doing so increases providers’ incomes and 
satisfies patient demands that providers do everything possible to 
improve a patient’s health.59 
Fee-for-service not only promotes a higher volume of care, but it 
also skews the system toward more costly interventions.  Because fee-
for-service payment rates are largely based on the time, resources, 
and expertise involved in treating a patient, more sophisticated, 
labor-intensive tests and procedures garner higher payment rates 
than less intensive interventions.60  Higher payments for specialized 
care in turn encourage physicians to select specialized fields over 
primary care.61  Because specialists are more likely to provide high-
tech, invasive tests and treatments, their care tends to be costly, 
particularly relative to the low-tech, primary and preventive care 
provided to chronically ill patients by primary care physicians.62  
Higher rates for more sophisticated care also incentivize providers to 
 
papers have demonstrated an empirical link between FFS payment and increased 
provision of services . . . .”). 
 58  See Berwick, supra note 9, at 761 (noting that “[u]nder current market 
dynamics and payment incentives, it is entirely rational for hospitals to try to fill beds 
and to expand services,” and in doing so hospitals “can protect profits best by 
protecting and increasing revenues”). 
 59  See James C. Robinson, Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment 
Incentives, 79 MILBANK Q. 149, 152 (2001) (arguing that by paying for care on a piece-
rate basis, fee-for-service “result[s] in an input-intensive, gold-plated form of service 
that expends resources as if they had no alternative uses and enjoys life as if there 
were no tomorrow”). 
 60  See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, The Perfect Storm of Overutilization, 299 
JAMA 2789, 278990 (2011) (commenting on the current system’s bias toward 
paying significantly more for procedures, rather than for evaluation and 
management). 
 61  See Hoangmai H. Pham & Paul B. Ginsburg, Unhealthy Trends: The Future of 
Physician Services, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1586, 1590 (2007) (“[L]ow incomes for [Primary 
Care Physicians] make these career paths unattractive to new physicians.  Among 
recent medical school graduates, a falling number choose to train in primary care 
specialties . . . .”); Bryan Vaughn et al., Can We Close the Income Gap Between Specialists 
and Primary Care Physicians?, 29 HEALTH AFF. 933 (2010) (explaining that because 
physicians have much greater wealth potential if they choose a specialty career than 
if they choose a primary care career, medical students typically choose a specialty 
career over a primary care career). 
 62  See Mashaw, supra note 51, at 47375 (stating that “we have too many highly 
trained or highly specialized [physicians]” and that “[t]his trend toward 
specialization skews our medical system toward invasive and expensive interventions 
and away from primary and preventive care and care-giving at a low-tech level for 
those with chronic illnesses and impairments,” as high-technology medicine is 
associated with specialized practice). 
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acquire the latest medical technology.63  Yet many of these highly 
specialized and costly interventions are no more effective than lower 
cost, low-tech alternatives.64  Consequently, the greater specialization 
and use of technology that results from fee-for-service often promotes 
higher cost care that is of limited marginal utility. 
Fee-for-service also discourages efforts to address the many 
systemic inefficiencies that plague our health care system.  First, 
piecemeal payment for acute care hinders greater collaboration and 
coordination among providers.  By paying primary care physicians, 
specialists, hospitals, and other providers separately for the care they 
provide, fee-for-service encourages providers to operate in separate 
“silos,” with each provider focusing only on the care they individually 
provide to patients.65  Moreover, fee-for-service generally pays 
providers only for care provided directly to patients, and not for the 
time required to coordinate care with other providers.66  Providers 
thus have little incentive to coordinate the care they provide to 
patients.67 
This lack of coordination, or fragmentation, among providers is 
a primary cause of the poor care chronically ill patients receive, as 
well as a significant contributor to the overutilization of health care.  
Primary care physicians, specialists, hospitals, and other providers 
often do not share with one another pertinent information about a 
patient.68  For example, primary care physicians frequently do not 
 
 63  See Pham & Ginsburg, supra note 61, at 1591 (stating that financial incentives 
cause physicians to favor services that are paid for particularly well over other 
services, and that physicians have increased their capacity to provide diagnostic and 
therapeutic procedures within their practices). 
 64  See, e.g., Kenneth Thorpe, The Rise in Health Care Spending and What to Do About 
It, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1436, 1443 (2005) (discussing a study finding that the least costly 
drug for treatment of hypertension among type 2 diabetics was as effective as the 
newer, more costly drugs); G. Barbas et al., New Technology and Health Care Costs—The 
Case for Robot-Assisted Surgery, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 701, 704 (2010) (stating that 
existing evidence fails to show that the long-term outcomes of robot-assisted surgery 
are superior to those of conventional procedures). 
 65  See Berwick, supra note 9, at 761 (stating that current payment incentives lead 
hospitals “to focus only on care within their walls,” with readmissions due to defects 
outside the hospitals deemed not their responsibility); Thomas Bodenheimer, 
Coordinating Care—A Perilous Journey Through the Health Care System, 358 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1064, 1064 (2008) (noting the lack of coordination among providers). 
 66  See id. at 1066 (“Most dollars are paid to physicians on the basis of . . . face-to-
face visit time rather than the between-visit time required for care coordination.”). 
 67  See Bazzoli, supra note 53, at 143 (“[F]ee-for-service promotes inefficiency 
because it lacks the incentives to coordinate care across providers . . . .”). 
 68  See Bodenheimer, supra note 65, at 1064 (summarizing studies that found that 
providers often provide insufficient information to one another on a timely basis); 
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provide information to their patients’ specialists, and vice versa.69  
This lack of communication commonly results in the duplication of 
tests.70  In addition, providers who are unaware of the care provided 
by other health care professionals cannot ensure that the patient 
receives care in the lowest cost setting.71  The lack of coordination 
also exacerbates preventable complications, particularly among 
chronically ill patients.  For instance, patients often do not receive 
appropriate follow-up care after their discharge from a hospital,72 
increasing the likelihood of complications requiring re-
hospitalization.  Similarly, patients seeing multiple providers may 
receive different diagnoses and treatment plans for their condition, 
or may be prescribed incompatible medications.73  As discussed in 
Part II.C, this fragmented nature of the health delivery system 
contributes to higher health care costs. 
Second, fee-for-service further deters efficient practices by 
penalizing providers who adopt cost-saving initiatives that reduce the 
amount of care provided. 74  As noted above, under a fee-for-service 
 
Peikes, supra note 38, at 603–04 (“Chronically ill patients often see multiple 
physicians . . . who may be incompletely aware of each other’s care.”).  
 69  For example, one 2000 study found that pediatricians failed to provide any 
information to their patients’ specialists in thirty-eight percent of referrals, and that 
the specialists failed to provide the referring physician feedback forty-six percent of 
the time.  See Christopher B. Forrest et al., Coordination of Specialty Referrals and 
Physician Satisfaction with Referral Care, 154 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 
499, 502 tbl.1 (2000).  See generally Bodenheimer, supra note 65, at 1064 (“[R]eferrals 
from primary care physicians to specialists often include insufficient information, 
and consultation reports from specialists back to primary care physicians are often 
late and inadequate.”). 
 70  See Bazzoli, supra note 53, at 143 (stating that fee-for-service does not 
encourage providers “to avoid costly service duplication”). 
 71  See id. (stating that fee-for-service does not encourage providers “to select the 
lowest cost setting for care”). 
 72  For example, in a 2005 survey of U.S. adults hospitalized in the previous two 
years for a chronic or acute illness, one-third reported that no follow-up 
arrangements were made after they were discharged from the hospital.  See Cathy 
Schoen et al., Taking the Pulse of Health Care Systems: Experiences of Patients with Health 
Problems in Six Countries, HEALTH AFF. – SUPPLEMENTAL WEB EXCLUSIVES: W5-509–W5-
525 (2005), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/11/28 
/hlthaff.w5.509.full.pdf+html?sid=64bc4e6c-ac84-4fae-a6a4-4e27a3e7830f. 
 73  See Berenson, supra note 31, at 721 (noting that the fragmented care that 
results from competent clinicians practicing in silos produces different diagnoses 
and treatment plans and prescribing incompatible medications). 
 74  See Boland, supra note 14, at 16 (noting that under fee-for-service, providers 
are not paid to implement proven cost savings programs).  See also Berwick, supra 
note 9, at 761 (explaining that hospitals have few incentives to address systemic 
efficiencies that would reduce their revenues or admission rates, as doing so would 
threaten hospitals’ profits).  
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system, providers can increase their revenues by providing more 
services.75  Providers therefore have little incentive to implement 
programs or protocols that would decrease the amount of care they 
provide.  For example, although studies have shown that discharge 
clinics and hospitalist programs can dramatically reduce the rate of 
hospital readmissions,76 few hospitals have invested in such 
programs.77  Providers also are slow to adopt protocols that reduce 
the risk of complications or medical errors, particularly those that 
require coordination among different providers across multiple care 
settings.78  Instead, fee-for-service incentives have resulted in a health 
care system primarily focused on the detection and acute treatment 
of disease, and not the reduction of preventable health risks.79 
Finally, many physicians and other health care professionals lack 
the capacity to adopt practices that will improve their management of 
chronically ill patients or reduce inappropriate care.  As noted above, 
fee-for-service encourages providers to operate in separate “silos,” 
with almost sixty percent of physicians practicing in solo practice or 
group practices with fewer than ten physicians.80  These small 
practices generally lack the resources to implement many of the 
strategies known to improve the quality of care.  Perhaps most 
importantly, few have implemented electronic medical records,81 
 
 75  See supra notes 5358 and accompanying text. 
 76  See Boland, supra note 14, at 19.   
 77  See id. at 16 (stating that hospitals do not have financial incentives to 
implement discharge clinics and hospitalist programs). 
 78  See, e.g., Atul Gawande, The Checklist, NEW YORKER, Dec. 10, 2007, at 86 
(describing the failure of hospital ICUs to adopt a checklist proven to reduce central 
line infections). 
 79  See Bobby Milstein et al., Analyzing National Health Reform Strategies with a 
Dynamic Simulation Model, 100 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 811, 811 (2010) (commenting 
that the medical industry “overemphasiz[es] disease detection and treatment while 
missing opportunities to reduce preventable risk and protect people’s health”). 
 80  In an analysis of physician practice arrangements for 2007-2008, the American 
Medical Association (AMA) found that the percentage of physicians practicing in 
different types of arrangements was as follows: 24.6% in solo practice, 21.4% in 
groups of two to four physicians, 12.9% in groups of five to nine physicians, 12.1% in 
groups of ten to forty-nine physicians, and only 4.6% in groups of more than fifty 
physicians.  21.2% of physicians were employed by hospitals and other institutions.  
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, THE PRACTICE ARRANGEMENTS OF PATIENT CARE 
PHYSICIANS 2007-2008: AN ANALYSIS BY AGE COHORT AND GENDER (2009), available at 
www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/health-policy/prp-200906-phys-prac-arrange.pdf. 
 81  See Chun-Ju Hsiao et al., Electronic Health Record Systems and Intent to Apply for 
Meaningful Use Incentives Among Office-Based Physician Practices: United States, 2001–
2011, NCHS Data Brief No. 79 (2011) (reporting findings from the National 
Ambulatory Medical Care Survey) (“Small practices generally have less capacity to 
implement electronic medical records.”).  Although physicians are increasingly 
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which can improve the coordination of care through the sharing of 
patient information among providers,82 reduce duplicative services,83 
and promote compliance with evidence-based guidelines.84  Health 
information technology also can help providers identify both 
inefficient practices and high-cost patients that may benefit from 
better patient management.85  In addition, these small practices often 
lack the personnel and capacity to adopt a team approach to caring 
for patients with chronic illness86 or implement clinical pathways that 
would improve the quality of care. 
With the current health care system unlikely to achieve cost 
savings through the elimination of waste or improved patient 
management, many have argued for reforming how we pay and 
deliver health care.  Part III discusses the leading proposal for doing 
soaccountable care organizations. 
III. THE CASE FOR ACOS 
Many health policy analysts have concluded that we cannot 
achieve cost savings through the elimination of waste and better 
patient management unless we shift away from our fragmented, fee-
for-service system to a system where large, integrated organizations 
assume financial responsibility for their treatment decisions.87  These 
organizations are referred to as accountable care organizations 
 
incorporating electronic health records (EHR) into their practices, preliminary 
estimates from 2010 suggest that only one-third of physicians have an EHR system 
meeting the criteria for a basic system.  Id. 
 82  See Ashish K. Jha et al., A Progress Report on Electronic Health Records in U.S. 
Hospitals, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1951, 1956 (2010) (“Use of the [electronic health] records 
has also been associated with improved coordination of care through the electronic 
exchange of information.”).  
 83  See Boland, supra note 14, at 19 (stating that a system-wide EHR can reduce 
duplicative services). 
 84  See Menachemi & Brooks, infra note 126. 
 85  See Boland, supra note 14, at 13 (“Relational databases allow health plans and 
medical administrators to retroactively analyze cost drivers, and predictive modeling 
software can identify high expense groups.”); Brent C. James & Lucy A. Savitz, How 
Intermountain Trimmed Health Care Costs Through Robust Quality Improvement Efforts, 30 
HEALTH AFF. 1185, 1189 (2011) (discussing the benefits of health information 
technology). 
 86  See Shortell & Casalino, supra note 81, at 95 (“Small practices generally . . . less 
frequently use teams to care for patients with chronic illness.”). 
 87  See Jeff Goldsmith, Accountable Care Organizations: The Case for Flexible 
Partnerships Between Health Plans and Providers, 30 HEALTH AFF. 32, 33 (2011) (“Some 
policy advocates believe that the way to stabilize health care costs is to engage 
providers in a form of population-based cost management—that is, to compel 
providers to constrain costs across the population of an entire community.”). 
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(ACOs).  But proponents of ACOs do not simply contend that ACOs 
can stabilize health care costs; they also claim that ACOs can 
simultaneously improve the quality of care provided to patients.  As 
described below, their optimism is not without support.  
Nevertheless, as discussed in Part IV, there is reason to believe that 
ACO proponents overstate the potential for ACOs to lower costs 
without adversely impacting the quality of care. 
A. ACOs: An Introduction 
An ACO generally is defined as a local organization comprised 
of and controlled by primary care physicians, specialists, and other 
providers that are jointly accountable for the cost and quality of the 
full continuum of care delivered to a patient population.88  
Accountability for both cost and quality goals are achieved by paying 
ACOs through an alternative payment methodology that rewards 
both cost savings and improvements in care.  In addition, by focusing 
on providers, the ACO model imposes joint accountability for both 
costs and quality at the level of actual care delivery, rather than on 
insurers and HMOs.89  The ACO model thus seeks to reform health 
care in two fundamental ways.  First, the model would achieve 
payment reform by shifting financial responsibility for the aggregate 
cost of care from payors to providers, and by tying providers’ 
reimbursement levels to the quality of care they provide.  Second, the 
model reforms the delivery system by moving away from one 
 
 88  See Boland, supra note 14, at 12 (“An ACO is generally defined as a local 
health care organization with a network of providers such as primary care physicians, 
specialists, and hospitals that are accountable for the cost and quality of care 
delivered to a particular population.”); Kelly Devers & Robert Berenson, Can 
Accountable Care Organizations Improve the Value of Health Care by Solving the Cost and 
Quality Quandaries?, TIMELY ANALYSIS OF IMMEDIATE HEALTH POL’Y ISSUES 1 (Oct. 2009) 
(“An ACO is a local health care organization and a related set of providers (at a 
minimum, primary care physicians, specialists, and hospitals) that can be held 
accountable for the cost and quality of care delivered to a defined population.”); 
Thomas L. Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations: A New New Thing with Some Old 
Problems, HEALTH L. OUTLOOK 2 (2010) (“The ACO concept envisions a legal entity 
comprised of and controlled by providers that would assume financial responsibility 
for the cost and care of a defined population . . . while being subject to a variety of 
quality standards and information reporting requirements.”); Mark McClellan et al., 
A National Strategy To Put Accountable Care Into Practice, 29 HEALTH AFF. 982, 982  
(2010) (“ACOs consist of providers who are jointly held accountable for achieving 
measured quality improvements and reductions in the rate of spending growth.”). 
 89  See Devers, supra note 88, at 3 (“Developers of the ACO concept also 
emphasize accountability, but focus directly on health care providers and the delivery 
system instead of insurers and HMOs. . . . The new approach, then, emphasizes 
accountability at the level of actual care delivery.”).  
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structured to manage acute health problems to a system organized 
around clinically integrated providers focused on preventive care and 
management of long-term health issues. 
ACOs are held accountable for the cost of care delivered to a 
patient population through various payment mechanisms that reward 
efficiency and/or penalize inefficiency, namely shared savings, shared 
savings and risk, and capitation.90  Under the shared savings model, 
the ACO continues to receive fee-for-service based payments, but 
payors also reward an ACO that meets or exceeds its targeted cost 
savings with a bonus equal to a percentage of the savings.91  The 
shared savings and risk model similarly entitles an ACO to a 
percentage of any savings, but also penalizes those who do not meet 
targeted cost savings with a downward adjustment in their fee-for-
service payments.92  Finally, under the capitated model, in place of 
fee-for-service payments an ACO would receive a single monthly 
payment for each insured it cares for, thereby forcing an ACO to 
internalize the cost of care it provides.93 
The ACO model also includes economic incentives for ACOs to 
improve quality by tying a portion of an ACO’s reimbursement to its 
performance on quality benchmarks.94  For example, an ACO that 
performs poorly on the relevant quality measures may be ineligible 
for any bonus payment under the shared savings or shared savings 
and risk payment models, even if the ACO lowers the cost of care.95  
Public reporting of an ACO’s quality performance also promotes 
holding an ACO accountable to the extent such information affects 
an ACO’s reputation.96 
 
 90  See David Balto, Making Health Reform Work: Accountable Care Organizations and 
Competition, CTR. AM. PROGRESS 5 (Feb. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/02/pdf/aco 
_competition.pdf (discussing the various models for giving ACOs incentives for cost 
control); see generally Chad Mulvany, Weighing the Benefits and the Risks of ACOs, 64 
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 48, 48 (2010) (stating that the economic incentives in the 
ACO model tie some portion of provider reimbursement to cost efficiency). 
 91  See Balto, supra note 90, at 5 (explaining the shared savings payment model).  
 92  See id. (explaining the shared savings and risk payment model). 
 93  See id. (explaining the capitation payment model).   
 94  See Mulvany, supra note 90, at 48 (stating that the economic incentives in the 
ACO model tie some portion of provider reimbursement to quality benchmarks). 
 95  See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. 425.100(b) (2012) (stating that ACOs participating in the 
Medicare shared savings program are eligible for shared savings only if they meet the 
minimum quality performance standards, among other requirements).   
 96  See Devers, supra note 88, at 1 (“Public reporting of cost and quality 
information to affect public perception of an ACO’s worth is another way of holding 
the ACO accountable for its performance.”).  
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Through these payment reforms, policymakers hope to shift the 
health care system away from a fragmented system focused on acute 
and specialized care.  Under the ACO model, an ACO’s participating 
providers are jointly accountable for the full spectrum of care 
provided to patients (whether or not provided by the ACO’s 
participating providers).  The ACO model of shared accountability 
thus encourages providers to look beyond the care they individually 
provide a patient during an episode of illness.97  It encourages 
providers to “deliver more efficient and coordinated care”98 and focus 
on patients’ long-term health, including the prevention of serious 
health problems.99 
The ACO model received the imprimatur of health care reform 
when it was incorporated into the Affordable Care Act as the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program.100  Under the program, ACOs that 
successfully lower the cost of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries 
will share a portion of the savings they generate for the Medicare 
program, provided they meet certain quality standards.101  In addition 
to the Shared Savings Program, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) has established the Pioneer ACO Model for 
organizations with experience operating as ACOs.102  Under this 
program, participating ACOs will receive higher levels of reward and 
assume greater financial risk than ACOs participating in the Shared 
Savings Program.103  In year three of the Pioneer ACO Model 
program, CMS will begin testing a capitated payment model, with 
eligible ACOs receiving a monthly per-beneficiary amount in lieu of 
part of or all of the ACO’s fee-for-service payments.104 
 
 97  See Jackson Williams, The “Shared Accountability” Approach to Physician Payment: 
Four Options for Developing Accountable Care Organizations, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 185, 
188 (2010) (explaining that the ACO model of shared accountability imposes 
“accountability [for] . . . the long-term health status of patients, not simply for the 
care that an individual professional delivers during a particular episode of illness”). 
 98   See Boland, supra note 14, at 12.  
 99  See Williams, supra note 97, at 188 (stating that the ACO model of shared 
accountability imposes accountability for the long-term status of patients). 
 100  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, sec. 3022 (2010).  
 101  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF FINAL RULE PROVISIONS 
FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS 
PROGRAM 4 (2011), available at https://www.cms.gov/MLNProducts/downloads 
/ACO_Summary_Factsheet_ICN907404.pdf.  
 102  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PIONEER ACCOUNTABLE CARE 
ORGANIZATION MODEL: GENERAL FACT SHEET 1 (2011), available at 
http://innovations.cms.gov/Files/fact-sheet/Pioneer-ACO-General-Fact-Sheet.pdf. 
 103  See id. at 4. 
 104  See id. 
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B. ACOs: The Case for Optimism 
Proponents of the ACO model contend that ACOs are well-
positioned to achieve what the current system has largely failed to 
doreduce wasteful care and the cost of treating chronically ill 
patients without compromising quality.  First, the financial incentives 
under the ACO model encourage ACOs to find ways to care for their 
patients while both using fewer resources and providing high quality 
care.  Eliminating wasteful care and better managing the care 
provided to those with chronic illness will be important components 
of an ACO’s efforts to achieve this goal.105  Second, as large, clinically 
and financially integrated organizations, ACOs have the resources 
and capacity to implement these strategies. 
Tying an ACO’s participating providers’ reimbursements to the 
overall cost of care they provide to patients uncouples providers’ 
incomes, either in whole or in part, from the volume and intensity of 
services they provide.106  As explained above, fee-for-service 
encourages a business model where providers generate higher 
incomes by increasing the volume and intensity of services they 
provide.107  In contrast, the opportunity for shared savings or 
capitated payments under the ACO model ties ACO providers’ 
incomes to the total resources used to treat their patient population. 
This shift therefore requires a new business model, as ACOs must 
identify ways in which to care for their patients using fewer 
resources.108 
The elimination of wasteful care will be an essential part of an 
ACO’s efforts to provide cost-effective patient care.  To generate 
shared savings or higher margins under capitation, ACOs will be 
motivated to reduce duplicative tests, unsafe procedures, and care 
 
 105  See infra notes 109111 and accompanying text. 
 106  See Fisher, supra note 5, at 221 (“With accountability for overall costs and 
quality, providers’ incomes can begin to be decoupled from the volume and intensity 
of services they provide.”). 
 107  See supra Part II.C.  For example, hospitals seeking to expand their profits 
frequently do so by (1) expanding their capacity, particularly in high-margin services 
such as interventional cardiology and intensive care, and (2) recruiting additional 
procedure-oriented specialists.  See WENNBERG, supra note 5, at 15 (discussing 
hospitals’ financial incentives to expand their capacity).  The ability of physicians to 
drive demand for these services by increasing the number of patients referred for 
such care helps ensure that a hospital’s expanded capacity will be utilized.  See 
generally id. (discussing the dynamics of supply-driven demand). 
 108  See Boland, supra note 14, at 16 (“Delivery systems such as ACOs will be given 
incentives to implement more cost-effective patient care models . . . .”). 
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lacking scientific support or sufficient value.109  The ACO model also 
rewards the more judicious use of high-cost technologies, inpatient 
care, and specialists, thereby encouraging greater reliance on less 
intensive medical care, lower-cost treatment settings, and primary 
care.110  The economic incentives under the ACO model also will 
foster the adoption of protocols that reduce the risk of medical errors 
or complications.111 
The financial incentives under the ACO model also should spur 
ACOs to re-orient treatment of chronic conditions away from treating 
acute episodes of illness toward better prevention and patient 
management, as doing so may reduce emergency room visits, hospital 
admissions, and ancillary services associated with preventable 
complications.112  Whereas under fee-for-service providers generally 
only focus on the care provided to patients within their four walls, 
holding ACOs accountable for all care provided to a patient gives 
ACOs strong incentives to coordinate the care provided to patients 
across all care settings.113  For example, ACOs would have the 
financial incentive to better manage care transitions for chronically ill 
patients, ensuring that all of the patient’s providers and other care-
givers have needed information and provide appropriate follow-up 
care.114  In addition, ACOs may devote more resources to monitoring 
patients with chronic conditions and intervening earlier when 
 
 109  See Newman, supra note 4, at 11 (stating that ACOs can generate shared 
savings by reducing unnecessary or duplicative services). 
 110  See Mulvany, supra note 90, at 48 (explaining that the economic incentives of 
the ACO model rewards providers for using high-cost technologies more judiciously; 
see Newman, supra note 4, at 11 (stating that ACOs will seek to promote lower-cost 
treatment options). 
 111  See Berwick, supra note 9, at 765 (stating that organizations that much reduce 
per capita costs would seek to eliminate waste, including errors); see also Fisher, supra 
note 5, at 221 (explaining that under the ACO model, “[i]nnovations that improve 
quality while reducing overall utilization (and costs) can be rewarded or at least not 
penalized”).  
 112  See Boland, supra note 14, at 13 (“Under new payment schemes [that hold 
providers accountable for the cost of care], it will be an economic necessity to avoid 
preventable admissions, readmissions, complications, ancillary services, and 
emergency room visits.”). 
 113  See Newman, supra note 4, at 9 (stating that to generate shared savings, ACOs 
will improve coordination of care). 
 114  See MICHAEL TRISOLINI ET AL., THE MEDICARE PHYSICIAN GROUP PRACTICE 
DEMONSTRATION: LESSONS LEARNED ON IMPROVING QUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN HEALTH 
CARE ix (2008) (commenting that the Medicare demonstration that served as a 
model for the Shared Savings Program gave participating organizations a financial 
incentive to better manage the many care transitions required for treatment of 
chronic diseases).  
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patients show the first signs of deterioration.115  An ACO also likely 
would take steps to promote greater compliance with recommended 
clinical guidelines in order to improve the quality of care provided to 
those with chronic conditions and limit preventable complications.116 
ACOs seeking cost-saving measures also may be slower to expand 
their capacity through the acquisition of new technology, increasing 
the supply of hospital beds, and employing additional specialists.117  
This in turn may reduce the frequency of care provided to ACO 
patients, as studies have found that the supply of these medical 
resources creates its own demand.  For example, Wennberg and his 
colleagues at the Dartmouth Atlas Project have documented a strong 
positive association between rates of diagnostic testing and imaging 
exams and the supply of equipment needed to perform these tests.118  
Similarly, the Dartmouth Atlas Project found a positive correlation 
between (1) hospitalization rates for most medical (non-surgical) 
conditions and the per capita supply of staffed hospital beds, and (2) 
admission rates to intensive care units and the supply of ICU beds.119  
Regions with a higher number of physicians per capita, particularly 
those specialists treating chronic illnesses, also showed higher 
physician visit rates.120  Moreover, as noted above, the Dartmouth 
Atlas Project found that regions providing more care did not achieve 
 
 115  See Berwick, supra note 9, at 764 (explaining that an integrator such as an ACO 
would assign more value and many more resources to the monitoring and 
interception of early signs of deterioration among patients with chronic heart 
failure).  
 116  See Newman, supra note 4, at 11 (stating that financial incentives encourage 
ACOs to develop or adopt existing care protocols to improve management of 
diseases, increase preventive services, and encourage early diagnosis). 
 117  ACOs may limit their capacity in an effort to better match supply to the 
patient population’s needs.  In addition, they may hesitate to acquire new 
technologies or make capital investments absent clear evidence that such investments 
sufficiently improve care so as to justify their costs.  See Berwick, supra note 9, at 765 
(stating that an “integrator” such as an ACO would view new technologies and capital 
investment with skepticism, and would better match supply to underlying needs).  
 118  See WENNBERG, supra note 5, at 10 (discussing the association between rates of 
diagnostic testing and imaging exams and the supply of equipment). 
 119  See id. (discussing the correlation between supply of hospital beds and ICU 
beds and rates of hospitalization and ICU admissions).   
 120  Id. (discussing the relationship between the supply of physicians and physician 
visits).  Although a possible explanation for the positive relationship between supply 
and utilization may be that regions with sicker patients acquire more medical 
resources because their patients require more care, researchers at the Dartmouth 
Atlas Project also found that the prevalence and severity of illness accounts for 
remarkably little of the variation in utilization rates across regions.  See id. at 9. 
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better patient outcomes at the population level.121  To the extent then 
that an ACO limits its capacity, doing so likely would reduce its 
provision of “supply-sensitive” care without necessarily affecting the 
quality of care at the population level. 
In addition to having the motivation to lower costs through the 
elimination of waste and better patient management, proponents 
contend that ACOs also have the resources and capacity to do so.  As 
large, clinically and financially integrated organizations, ACOs have 
several advantages over the current, fragmented system of care that is 
largely populated by small group practices.  First, ACOs can address 
the problems of fragmentation by bringing within one organization 
the various physicians, other health professionals, and institutional 
providers needed to treat patients with chronic conditions.122  In 
doing so, the ACO can improve coordination among the various 
providers treating a patient and better implement initiatives that 
require cooperation among multiple providers operating in different 
treatment settings.123 
Second, ACOs are better positioned to implement electronic 
health records given their deeper financial resources and economies 
of scale.124  As discussed previously, electronic health records are 
instrumental to providers’ efforts to reduce waste and provide better 
care to chronically ill patients.  By facilitating the sharing of patient 
information among an ACO’s participating providers, electronic 
health records promote better coordination among the multiple 
providers treating a chronically ill patient.  This sharing of 
information also reduces the need for duplicative tests and 
procedures.125  In addition, use of electronic health records can 
promote greater compliance among ACO physicians with evidence-
based guidelines, thereby reducing the amount of unnecessary or 
inappropriate care and promoting more effective care for chronically 
 
 121  See supra notes 2224 and accompanying notes. 
 122  See Devers, supra note 88, at 721 (“ACOs offer the promise of decreasing 
fragmentation of healthcare delivery by bringing under one virtual roof the various 
medical specialists and other health professionals and institutions that need to 
coordinate care for the growing number of patients with multiple chronic 
conditions.”).  
 123  See Boland, supra note 14, at 16 (commenting that preventing avoidable events 
requires that “measures and methodologies be implemented across all departments 
and services”). 
 124  See Shortell & Casalino, supra note 81, at 95 (“Small practices generally have 
less capacity to implement electronic medical records . . . .”). 
 125  See Boland, supra note 14, at 19 (noting that system-wide electronic medical 
records reduce duplicative services).  
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ill patients.126 
Third, ACOs, with their electronic health records, larger patient 
populations, and financial resources, can generate the statistically 
reliable data needed to support efforts to improve efficiency and 
quality.127  Retrospective analysis of patient data can reveal areas 
where significant gaps exist between actual practice and known best 
practices,128 gaps the ACO can then address through staff training or 
the development of patient care protocols.  Analysis of patient 
outcomes also may identify certain practices that either increase or 
reduce the risk of complications requiring costly care.  For example, 
Intermountain Health Care, one of the model organizations for 
ACOs, discovered during its review of patient data that the risk of 
wound infections was much lower when patients were administered 
prophylactic antibiotics two hours before surgery.  Intermountain 
Health Care then developed clinical protocols based on these 
findings that reduced its rate of post-surgical infections by fifty 
percent.129  Analysis of patient data also can help ACOs identify the 
high-risk, high-cost patient populations most likely to benefit from 
better patient management.130 
Finally, ACOs are more likely than small physician groups to 
have experienced administrators that can promote the elimination of 
wasteful care and better patient management.  For example, ACO 
administrators can promote the effective utilization of health 
information technology, oversee the development of clinical 
pathways, and coordinate the implementation of cost-effective patient 
 
 126  See Richard Hillestad et al., Can Electronic Medical Record Systems Transform 
Health Care? Potential Health Benefits, Savings, and Costs, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1103, 1110 
(2005) (stating that electronic medical record systems can promote integration of 
evidence-based recommendations for preventive care and management of 
chronically ill patients); Nir Menachemi & Robert G. Brooks, Reviewing the Benefits 
and Costs of Electronic Health Records and Associated Patient Safety Technologies, 30 HEALTH 
MED. SYSTEMS 159, 165 (2006) (stating that clinical decision-making systems can 
improve diagnostic and treatment regimen decision-making by linking to evidence-
based practice guidelines).   
 127  See Stephen M. Shortell & Lawrence P. Casalino, Health Care Reform Requires 
Accountable Care Systems, 300 JAMA 95, 95 (2008) (“Small practices generally . . . are 
less able to provide statistically reliable and valid data on quality and efficiency 
measures.”).  
 128  See Boland, supra note 14, at 16 (explaining the potential for retrospective 
analytical tools to identify medical events and the rate of those events, with practices 
then compared to best-practices databases).  
 129  See Carpenter, supra note 6, at 135 (discussing Intermountain Health Care’s 
continuous quality improvement projects). 
 130  See Boland, supra note 14, at 16 (stating that accountable care organizations 
can use upfront analytics to identify, at-risk, high-cost populations). 
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care models.131  ACO management also can monitor the practice 
patterns of individual physicians and other providers, taking action 
against those who fail to adhere to organizational objectives.132  
Finally, ACO administrators can engage in careful, prospective 
resource planning, guarding against excess capacity and ensuring 
that an ACO’s resources match the needs of its patient population.133 
IV.  ACOS AND THE COST-QUALITY TRADE-OFF 
ACOs’ potential to eliminate wasteful care and better manage 
patient care offers hope that ACOs can successfully contain costs 
without adversely impacting, and perhaps even improving, the quality 
of care.  And yet we should view with skepticism the promise that 
ACOs can painlessly contain costs.  First, eliminating much of the 
care considered “wasteful” involves eliminating care that will prove 
beneficial to some patients.  Second, the potential cost savings from 
better management of patients with chronic conditions may be lower 
than ACO proponents contend.  Third, long-term inflationary 
pressures from advances in medical technology will require ACOs to 
continuously find new ways of lowering health care costs savings, but 
doing so without sacrificing quality will prove difficult.  Finally, even if 
in theory ACOs could successfully reduce costs without 
compromising the quality of care, in practice some ACOs may stint 
on the care they provide patients given their financial incentives to 
do so. 
 
 131  See James & Savitz, How Intermountain Trimmed Health Care Costs Through Robust 
Quality Improvement Efforts, 30:6 HEALTH AFF. 1185, 1185, 1187 (2011) (explaining that 
Intermountain Health Care improved the quality of clinical care while lowering costs 
by creating “an administrative structure that uses its robust clinical information to 
oversee the performance of care delivery and to drive positive change,” and that its 
leaders demanded a strategic plan that included creating information systems for 
clinical and financial management and a management structure to oversee the 
delivery of clinical care). 
 132  See Gregory Pelnar & Gretchen Weiss, Rule of Reason Analysis for Accountable 
Care Organizations, 11 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 6 (2011) (noting that ACOs “may 
monitor the contributions of their physicians to achieving savings and high quality 
scores”).  For example, if management identifies a physician who fails to adhere to 
clinical protocols, does not coordinate effectively with other providers, or 
consistently provides higher cost care, they may elect to educate the physician in 
areas where he or she is deficient, reduce the physician’s bonus, or terminate the 
physician’s contract with the ACO.  See id. (stating that ACOs may reward high 
performing physicians with higher compensation and threaten lower performers 
with termination). 
 133  See Devers, supra note 88, at 12 (stating that one of the essential 
characteristics of an ACO is the capability of prospectively planning budgets and 
resource needs). 
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A. The Waste Hypothesis—Revisited 
As discussed in Part II.A, many contend that a significant portion 
of the care provided by the United States healthcare system is 
“wasteful,” “ineffective,” “unnecessary,” and “inappropriate.”  Such 
terminology suggests that eliminating wasteful care need not result in 
patients being denied potentially beneficial care.  Indeed, 
eliminating care that is duplicative, wasteful, or unsafe may prove a 
painless approach to reducing costs.  But much of the care 
considered “wasteful” falls under a different category of wastecare 
of uncertain or insufficient clinical effectiveness.134  For the reasons 
discussed below, curbing the provision of such care by ACOs 
inevitably involves eliminating care that does some good. 
For many medical treatments, there exists insufficient data 
concerning the treatment’s clinical effectiveness,135 as evaluating a 
 
 134  See Ari Hoffman & Steven Pearson, ‘Marginal Medicine’: Targeting Comparative 
Effectiveness Research to Reduce Waste, 28 HEALTH AFF. w710, w711 (2009) (noting that 
the most likely source of potentially wasteful care is marginal medicine, that is, care 
lacking adequate evidence of clinical benefit, and care whose costs exceed its 
marginal benefits); Henry Aaron, Waste, We Know You are Out There, 359 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1865, 1866 (2008) (stating that “most” of the care labeled as waste is not useless 
care but provides some benefit). 
 135  See Jan Blustein & Theodore Marmor, Cutting Waste by Making Rules: Promises, 
Pitfalls, and Realistic Prospects, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 155556 (1992).  Variations in 
medical care are greatest when uncertainty exists regarding the clinical benefits of 
alternative treatments.  See Opportunities to Increase Efficiency in Health Care: Health 
Reform Summit of the Committee on Finance (2008) (statement of Peter Orszag, Director, 
Cong. Budget Office) (“Variations in health care are often most dramatic when there 
is uncertainty about what kind of treatment to administer.”).  On the other hand, 
when the clinical evidence clearly supports a particular course of treatment, studies 
have found little variation across providers.  See WENNBERG, supra note 5, at 14 
(“[W]here clinical evidence is strong, the diagnosis is certain, and when doctors 
agree on the course of treatment, there is remarkably little variation from region to 
region.”).  To address weaknesses in the clinical science, many advocate greater 
research of patient outcomes and the development of evidence-based clinical 
guidelines.  See WENNBERG, supra note 5, at 18 (“Many physicians and policymakers 
will argue that what is needed are evidence-based clinical guidelines . . . .”).  Indeed, 
the Affordable Care Act establishes the Center for Quality Improvement and Patient 
Safety, a new center charged with developing and disseminating best practice 
guidelines.  H.R. 3590, §§ 3013, 10303 (2010).  While these efforts to promote more 
evidence-based medicine are certainly worthwhile, substantial uncertainty in 
medicine will remain, as testing the effectiveness of diagnostic tests or therapies is 
often extremely expensive and sometimes raises serious ethical issues.  See Blustein, 
supra note 135, at 1549 (describing some of the problems with clinical trials).  While 
epidemiological studies and other methods can yield helpful information, they too 
raise challenges for the physicians who must interpret them.  See id. (describing 
alternatives to controlled clinical trials as useful but imperfect).  In addition, few 
studies track a treatment’s long-term impact on a patient’s health.  See Barbara Evans, 
Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the 
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treatment’s clinical efficacy often takes years, particularly with regards 
to its long-term impact on patients’ health.136  Some care lacking clear 
evidence establishing clinical efficacy certainly would prove wasteful, 
either because it provides no clinical benefit or its benefits are no 
greater than lower-cost alternatives.  But, for many of these so-called 
“wasteful” treatments, time will clearly establish the treatment’s 
clinical benefit for particular patients.137  To the extent that an ACO 
limits the provision of a treatment until its effectiveness is verified, 
patients denied the treatment in the interim would be denied 
potentially beneficial care. 
Similarly, ACO providers who elect not to provide their patients 
care that on average may be of little to no value nevertheless may 
adversely impact the quality of care provided to some patients.  Even 
when we possess information on a treatment’s overall clinical 
effectiveness, statistical projections based on large population 
averages may hide significant variation among patients.  Because 
patient conditions and characteristics can vary, a given intervention 
may affect patients differently.138  Consequently, a treatment that on 
average has little clinical effectiveness, and thus appears “wasteful,” in 
fact may be very effective for a small group of patients.139  For 
example, while the drug clopidogrel (Plavix) generally has no benefit 
over aspirin in preventing myocardial infarction and stroke, for 
approximately one in every two hundred patients the drug in fact 
prevents myocardial infarction and stroke.140  Therefore,  a 
treatment’s potential clinical benefits for an individual patient often 
remain uncertain, with some care that, on average, is of no, or merely 
marginal, benefit potentially benefitting some patients.141 
 
Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 44647 (2010) (noting that few clinical 
trials are of sufficient duration to allow for the detection of an intervention’s long-
term effects on health).  So although more research on patient outcomes will 
improve the scientific basis for medical decisions, the limits of science and constant 
medical innovation mean much uncertainty will remain.  
 136  See Evans, supra note 135. 
 137  See Hoffman & Pearson, supra note 134, at w712 (stating that care considered 
wasteful because there remains uncertainty regarding its clinical effectiveness “may 
turn out to be highly effective, at least for some patients”). 
 138  See Aaron, supra note 134, at 1866 (“A given intervention typically affects 
individual patients differently”). 
 139  See Jost, supra note 15, at 15 (stating that statistical projections based on large 
populations may suggest that a particular treatment is of marginal value, when in fact 
it may be of value for particular patients). 
 140  See Hoffman & Person, supra note 134, at w714 (discussing the potential 
benefits of clopidogrel). 
 141  See Jost, supra note 15, at 15 (“Given the infinite variability of patients and 
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Finally, many treatments are considered wasteful not because 
they provide no clinical benefit, but because their benefits may be 
insufficient when compared to the treatment’s cost.142 Eliminating 
care on cost-benefit grounds would, by definition, involve denying 
care that is of potential benefit to patients.143  For example, 
chemotherapy for advanced cancer may only add a few weeks of life 
at a cost of tens of thousands of dollars. 144  While many would 
consider the cost of such treatment as outweighing its potential 
benefit, few would claim that extending a patient’s life by a few weeks 
is of no benefit.  Thus, while limiting care of uncertain or insufficient 
clinical value may be justified on utilitarian grounds, their 
elimination certainly would not be “painless”; rather, it necessarily 
includes eliminating care that would be effective for some patients.145 
B. Better Management of Patients with Chronic ConditionsRevisited 
As discussed above in Part III.B, supporters of ACOs contend 
that ACOs can achieve substantial savings while improving patient 
outcomes not only through the elimination of inefficient care, but 
also through better management of chronically ill patients.  
Specifically, proponents contend that through enhanced screening 
and monitoring, improved patient education,146 better coordination 
of care, and greater adherence to best medical practices, ACOs will 
 
conditions, it is often quite difficult to know with any precision how useful any test or 
procedure will be ex ante.”).  See also Mashaw, supra note 51, at 465 (stating that the 
task of defining “waste” and “abuse” in medicine is greatly complicated by the use of 
“averages to make judgments about individual cases”). 
 142  See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 143  See Blustein, supra note 135, at 156061 (“When cutting waste on economic 
grounds, we inevitably eliminate some services that do some good.”); Aaron, supra 
note 134, at 1866 (“Even those interventions deemed excessively costly actually help 
some patients.”). 
 144  See Hoffman and Pearson, supra note 134, at w713 (discussing the cost-
effectiveness of chemotherapy for advanced cancer). 
 145  See Blustein, supra note 135, at 1564 (“[B]ecause the spectrum of care includes 
care that is effective, . . . we must watch out for immoderate promises about painless 
‘waste cutting.’”). 
 146  See supra notes 4547 and accompanying text (discussing examples of medical 
interventions that both improved quality while lowering costs).  See also S.H. Woolf, A 
Closer Look at the Economic Argument for Disease Prevention, 301 JAMA 536, 536 (2009) 
(stating that childhood immunizations, smoking cessation counseling, and aspirin 
prophylaxis among patients at increased risk for cardiovascular disease yield net cost 
savings); L.B. Russell, Preventing Chronic Disease: An Important Investment, But Don’t 
Count on Costs Savings, 28 HEALTH AFF. 42, 44 (2009) (explaining that vaccination 
against pneumococcal pneumonia reduces spending for adults ages 5064 with 
certain chronic conditions). 
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reduce the complications associated with chronic conditions.  This in 
turn will yield cost savings by decreasing the use of acute care 
services.  Unfortunately, sweeping statements about the cost-saving 
potential of improved care for chronically ill patients may be 
overreaching. 
Although some improvements in the care provided to 
chronically ill patients can both improve patient outcomes while 
containing costs, a review of the health economics literature suggests 
that most do not.  Studies of both preventive measures and disease 
management programs147 have repeatedly found that most fail to 
produce net cost savings, and in some cases the programs even 
increase health care spending.148  One primary reason for these 
findings is the high costs of the programs themselves.  While better 
chronic care can reduce the frequency of costly acute treatments for 
complications, these cost savings may not make up the costs 
associated with additional physician visits and monitoring, increased 
use of medications, and patient counseling.149  Similarly, while earlier 
detection of a disease may prevent having to treat the disease later in 
a more serious and costly form, the screening costs for healthy people 
often far outweigh any savings from earlier treatment of those with 
 
 147  The term disease management refers to a range of activities intended to 
address shortcomings in current medical treatment.  Specifically, disease 
management programs aim to help patients better manage their chronic conditions, 
improve the monitoring of patients’ symptoms and treatment plans, promote closer 
adherence to evidence-based guidelines, and better coordinate the care provided to 
patients seeing multiple providers.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 2 
(explaining what disease management is). 
 148  See Joshua Cohen et al., Does Preventive Care Save Money? Health Economics and 
the Presidential Candidates, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 661, 662 (2008) (reviewing numerous 
studies of preventive measures and concluding that most do not save money); 
Russell, supra note 146, at 42 (arguing that prevention usually increases medical 
spending); Bobby Milstein et al., Analyzing National Health Reform Strategies with a 
Dynamic Simulation Model, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 811, 812 (2010) (concluding that 
better preventive and chronic care do not typically reduce total health care costs); 
Soeren Mattke et al., Evidence for the Effect of Disease Management: Is $1 Billion a Year a 
Good Investment?, 13 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 670, 670 (2007) (reviewing the literature 
on disease management and concluding that there is little evidence disease 
management leads to a net reduction of direct medical costs); Luck, supra note 35, at 
400 (stating that the published literature on disease management does not provide 
evidence that improved care for patients with complex conditions produce cost 
savings); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 1  (concluding that the evidence of 
cost savings from disease management is quite limited). 
 149  See Milstein et al., supra note 148, at 812 (stating that good preventive and 
chronic care typically does not reduce total health care costs even though it can 
reduce the frequency of more costly acute complications and urgent hospital visits, as 
it requires additional visits and medications). 
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the disease.150  The incentive payments typically offered to providers 
to better manage care also may outweigh any reduction in 
utilization.151 
Ironically, better care also can result in higher utilization rates.  
For example, more frequent screenings may increase costs by 
resulting in the unnecessary treatment of “false positives,” with some 
of those treatments leading to costly complications and side-effects.152  
In addition, improved care sometimes only slows down a disease’s 
progression, thus simply delaying, but not avoiding, the cost of 
treating complications.153  Moreover, because better care often 
extends the life of persons with chronic conditions, improved patient 
management may result in chronically ill patients consuming more 
care over time, particularly as many will develop additional chronic 
conditions as they age.154 
Clearly, medical interventions that fail to produce net savings 
still may be worthwhile.  Improved care for those with chronic 
conditions can increase patients’ length and quality of life at a 
reasonable costthat is, they are cost-effective and thus a good use of 
 
 150  See Ron Goetzel, Do Prevention Or Treatment Services Save Money? The Wrong 
Debate, 28 HEALTH AFF. 37, 37 (2009) (“[S]creening costs for healthy people far 
outweigh treatment costs for the few who develop the disease.”); Cohen, supra note 
148, at 661 (“[S]creening costs will exceed savings from avoided treatment in cases in 
which only a very small fraction of the population would have become ill in the 
absence of preventive measures.”); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LESSONS FROM MEDICARE’S 
DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS ON DISEASE MANAGEMENT, CARE COORDINATION, AND VALUE-
BASED PAYMENT 12 (2012) (stating that evaluations of Medicare programs involving 
disease management and care coordination found that in nearly every program, 
“spending was either unchanged or increased relative to the spending that would 
have occurred in the absence of the program”). 
 151  For example, a study of Medicare disease management and care coordination 
programs by the Congressional Budget Office found that programs using care 
managers integrated into physicians’ offices did not yield sufficient savings in regular 
Medicare expenditures to off-set the additional fees paid to program participants for 
enhanced care coordination.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 150, at 4 
(discussing results from Medicare demonstration programs using care managers). 
 152  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 6.  For example, when Carol Smith, a 
former smoker, got a CT scan for the purpose of detecting early lung cancer, 
physicians found a lesion in her lung.  A subsequent surgical biopsy revealed that the 
lesion was benign, but complications from the surgery left her in intensive care for 
two weeks and without full use of her left arm.  See Petersen, supra note 30. 
 153  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 14 (noting that disease 
management programs might merely change the timing of significant expenditures 
by postponing, rather than preventing, the need for acute treatment).   
 154  See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH CARE COSTS: A PRIMER 25 (2012) (stating 
that one reason for growing health care costs is developments in medicine and 
medical technology that enable people to live longer, often with chronic conditions 
that require ongoing medical care). 
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society’s resources.155  Nevertheless, we should view with skepticism 
claims that ACOs can painlessly lower health care costs simply by 
better managing the care provided to their chronically ill patients. 
C. The Long-Term Challenge of Technology-Driven Inflation 
As discussed in Part III, ACOs clearly have the potential to lower 
costs without harming quality by eliminating obviously wasteful 
practices and adopting patient management techniques known to 
reduce costs.  The inflationary effect of advances in medical 
technology, however, will require ACOs to continuously find new 
ways of lowering costs.  For the reasons discussed below, in the long 
term ACOs likely will be unable to do so without compromising the 
quality of care they provide to their patients. 
Advances in medical technology156 are the major contributor to 
rising health care costs,157 accounting for one-half to two-thirds of 
 
 155  See Fireman, supra note 11, at 73 (stating that most of the medical 
interventions recommended for treatment of patients with chronic conditions are 
cost-effective, in that “[t]hey increase the length and quality of life at a cost that is 
reasonable – a good value compared with other services . . . .”); Cohen et al., supra 
note 148, at 662 (“Some preventive measures . . . may still be worthwhile because 
they confer substantial health benefits relative to their cost.”); Milstein, supra note 
79, at 812 (“[G]ood preventive and chronic care is typically cost-effective (improving 
health at reasonable cost and thus arguably worth doing) . . . .”). 
 156  Technology advances include innovations and improvements in medical 
equipment, pharmaceuticals, and procedures.  See Carpenter, supra note 6, at 133 
(defining medical technology advances).  
 157  See Jessica Mantel, Setting National Coverage Standards for Health Plans Under 
Healthcare Reform, 58 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 221, 240 (2010) (“By far the largest factor 
contributing to increasing healthcare costs is advances in medical technology.”).  
While some new technologies decrease costs, most increase health care expenditures.  
See Carpenter, supra note 6, at 133 (“While some technologies are cost decreasing, 
the majority in health care are cost increasing.”).  Because the price for new medical 
technologies generally is quite high, price inflation for healthcare typically exceeds 
the inflation rate for other goods and services.  See Mantel, supra, at 240.  In addition, 
new technologies that identify additional patients with a condition increase the 
population receiving care, which in turn increases health expenditures.  See 
Carpenter, supra note 6, at 133 (“Some new technologies identify and expand the 
population in need of care without necessarily offering new or better ways to treat 
the conditions.  Similarly, new technologies that allow treatment of previously 
untreatable conditions often raise health expenditures by increasing the number of 
patients receiving treatment.  See Mantel, supra at 240 (“By increasing the number of 
health conditions for which there exist potentially beneficial treatments, advances in 
medical technology have caused significant increases in aggregate utilization of 
healthcare services.”); see Mathias Goyen & Jorg F. Debatin, Healthcare Costs for New 
Technologies, 36 (Suppl.) EUR. J. NUCL. MED. MOL. IMAGING, S139, S140 (2008) (stating 
that new technologies affect health care costs by developing treatments for previously 
untreatable conditions).  New technologies that merely ameliorate symptoms but do 
not cure or slow-down a disease also result in higher expenditures.  See Carpenter, 
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annual medical spending increases.158  With new breakthroughs in 
biomedical and genetics research occurring with greater frequency, 
future advances in technology likely will place even greater pressure 
on costs.159  Consequently, any initial savings achieved by ACOs 
eventually would be overcome by rising costs attributable to medical 
advances.160  If in the long-term ACOs are to successfully rein in rising 
health care costs, they must continuously find new ways to achieve 
cost savings. 
Unfortunately, there are reasons to doubt ACOs’ long-term 
potential to achieve new cost savings without sacrificing the quality of 
care provided to patients.  As discussed in Part III.A, ACOs could 
painlessly lower costs by eliminating medical interventions shown to 
be unsafe, clinically ineffective, duplicative, or more costly than 
comparable alternatives.  Once ACOs exploit this “low hanging fruit,” 
however, further reductions in so-called wasteful care would involve 
denying patients care of uncertain or insufficient clinical value.  As 
previously discussed, eliminating care of uncertain or insufficient 
clinical value inevitably involves denying some patients potentially 
beneficial care.161 
 
supra note 6, at 133 (“Some of our newest biotechnologies are not even aimed at 
cure but merely amelioration of symptoms.  This is likely to result in higher 
expenditures because treatment will extend over a longer period of time without 
affecting a cure.”).   
 158  See Goyen & Debatin, supra note 157, at 36 (“Most experts believe that medical 
technology advances account for half to two-thirds of annual spending increases.”). 
 159  See Gregg Bloche, Beyond the “R Word”?  Medicine’s New Frugality, 366 NEW ENG. 
J. OF MED. 1951, 1952 (2012) (explaining that even if we could eliminate all waste, 
medical costs will eventually rise again given the high rate of medical inflation, and 
therefore in the long-term we must “start saying no to some beneficial care”); Henry 
J. Aaron, The Unsurprising Surprise of Renewed Health Care Cost Inflation, 31 HEALTH 
AFF., w85 (Jan. 23, 2002), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2002/02/23/hlthaff.w2.85.full.pdf+
html (stating that the forces driving up costs over the long haul are intensifying given 
that the staggering fecundity of biomedical research is increasing); see also David S. 
Hilzenrath, What’s Left to Squeeze? Managed-Care Firms Find Health Costs Rising – and 
Cuts Harder to Come By, WASHINGTON POST, July 6, 1997, at H01  (referencing the 
opinion of Robert J. Rubin, former president of the Lewin Group, who stated that 
controlling costs may be harder to do in the future when research in genetics and 
biotechnology produce important breakthroughs).  For example, new cancer 
therapies can cost in the $100,000 range.  See Lola Butcher, Oncology Community 
Concerned About CMS ACO Proposal, ONCOLOGY TIMES 40 (2011) (noting the high cost 
of two new cancer therapies, Sipuleucel-T (Provenge) at $90,000 for a three-month 
course of treatment and ipilmumab (Yervoy) at $120,000 for a four-dose regimen). 
 160  See Blustein, supra note 135, at 1566 (arguing that savings achieved from a one-
time reduction in expenditures would inevitable be dwarfed by rising costs 
attributable to the medical care inflation). 
 161  See supra Part IV.A. 
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Similarly, mature ACOs that have already successfully lowered 
costs through improved treatment of patients with chronic conditions 
may find generating further savings a significant challenge.  As two 
commentators have noted, “[t]he greatest amount of quality 
improvement engendered by disease management occurs when 
additional care is provided to patients who have not been receiving 
available beneficial care.”162  When an organization successfully 
improves its patients’ health, however, further improvements in 
health status may be difficult to achieve.  For example, an ACO that 
significantly reduces the readmission rate for its patients hospitalized 
for congestive heart failure may have little room for improvement, 
with further reductions in the readmission rate proving elusive.  
Mature ACOs also may find that any marginal improvement in the 
health of its chronically ill patients fails to yield net cost savings, as 
any savings generated from fewer hospital admissions and other 
reductions in acute care frequently will be outweighed by the cost of 
the disease management program itself.163  These challenges may 
explain why a study of new chronic disease management techniques 
adopted by Kaiser Permanente found that the interventions failed to 
yield absolute cost savingsas a mature integrated delivery system, 
Kaiser Permanente had already harvested the benefits of good patient 
management, including reductions in hospital admissions and short 
average length-of-stays.164 
So although ACOs’ initial efforts to eliminate wasteful care and 
better manage chronically ill patients may produce cost savings 
without adversely impacting the quality of care, for mature ACOs, 
finding further cost savings without compromising quality may prove 
extraordinarily difficult.165 ACOs thus do not offer a permanent 
 
 162  Francis Crosson & Philip Madvig, Does Population Management of Chronic Disease 
Lead to Lower Costs of Care?, 23 HEALTH AFF. 76, 78 (2004). 
 163  To yield net savings, a disease management program must significantly reduce 
hospital admissions rates and other care associated with treating preventable 
complications.  Opportunities for such savings are far greater when a disease 
management program targets a sicker population.  See Ariel Linden & Julia Adler-
Milstein, Medicare Disease Management in Policy Context, 29 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 1, 3–
4 (2008) (explaining that to break even a disease management program must reduce 
hospital admissions rates, and that it is easier to do so with a sicker population 
because disease programs targeting sicker populations are likely to reduce the 
greatest percentage of hospitalizations). 
 164  See Crosson & Madvig, supra note 162, at 7778 (discussing the results of 
Fireman and colleagues’ study on Kaiser Permanente’s disease management 
program over the period 1996–2002). 
 165   See id. at 78 (“[I]ncremental disease management interventions, beyond those 
already achieved by mature [Integrated Delivery Systems], will prove to be elusive in 
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solution to rising health care costs if we also insist that they not 
sacrifice quality. 
D. ACOs and the Risk of Under-treatment 
Even if in theory ACOs could successfully contain costs while 
improving the quality of care, in practice some ACOs may stint on the 
care they provide patients.  First, under the ACO payment model, 
ACOs have a financial incentive to withhold medically appropriate 
care from their patients in order to increase their shared savings or 
profit margins.  Second, an ACO seeking to limit costs may fail to 
ensure that it has sufficient resources at the organizational level to 
meet the full range of needs among its patient population.  Although 
tying an ACO’s payment to its performance on various quality 
measures provides some protection against this risk of under-
treatment, weaknesses in quality measures mean some patients will 
remain vulnerable. 
Under the ACO payment models, providers profit by minimizing 
the cost of care provided to patients.  A primary means by which 
ACOs will limit costs is through their gatekeeping rolethat is, 
determining which services should be provided to individual patients.  
In this gatekeeping role, ACOs may limit patient care by making 
fewer referrals to specialists, ordering fewer tests, and eliminating 
high-tech, expensive treatments.  To the extent that there is much fat 
in the current system of care, limiting such care may not necessarily 
harm the quality of care.166  There is the very real risk, however, that 
some ACO providers may go beyond trimming fat and deny or delay 
providing their patients appropriate medical interventions in order 
to maximize their shared savings or profit margins.167  The ACO 
 
the end for payers.”); SIEMENS, NAVIGATING THE PERFECT STORM: HEALTHCARE IN 2010 
AND BEYOND 8 (2010), available at http://www.medical.siemens.com/siemens/en_US 
/gg_hs_FBAs/files/IT_Solutions_And_Consulting/New_2009/ARRA/2010-11-
10_NavigatingthePerfectStorm11-10_A9133-101897-C1-4A00.pdf (noting that one 
health care executive at a large health care system had found cutting costs to be 
“getting harder,” as the system had already “picked most of the low-hanging fruit in 
terms of cost containment”). 
 166  See supra Part I.A. 
 167  See Stephen Ubl, ACOs: Improved Care or Roadblocks to Innovation, HEALTH AFF. 
BLOG (Apr. 25, 2011, 1:41 P.M.), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2011/04/25/acos-
improved-care-or-roadblocks-to-innovation/ (noting the danger of ACOs stinting on 
care); National Health Council’s Comments on CMS-1345-P (2011) (stating that the 
financial incentives under the Medicare Shared Savings Program “could lead to 
underutilization of new and/or costlier technologies that have the potential to 
improve individual patient outcomes”); Pelnar & Weiss, supra note 132 (“[B]ecause 
the ACO model financially rewards provider organizations for achieving cost savings, 
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model thus poses a real risk of under-treatment, particularly for 
patients requiring costly, complex care. 
In addition, resource allocation decisions at the organizational 
level may result in ACO patients having diminished access to 
medically appropriate care.  Because ACOs must provide care to their 
patients using fewer resources, ACO administrators and professionals 
not only must be more judicious in what care they provide to 
individual patients, but also must establish spending priorities at the 
organizational level.  For example, an ACO may decide to lower its 
costs by reducing its nursing staff, limiting the number of specialists 
in the ACO, eliminating inpatient beds, or delaying the acquisition of 
new technology.168  Although the findings of the Dartmouth group 
suggest scaling back on available services may not adversely impact 
quality, some ACOs may go beyond trimming excess resources.  To 
the extent that an ACO fails to maintain adequate resources to meet 
its patient population’s needs, its patients will have diminished access 
to necessary care. 
Recognizing the risk of under-treatment, the ACO model ties an 
ACO’s payments to its performance on selected quality measures.169  
For example, ACOs participating in the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program must report on thirty-three quality measures170 and perform 
 
it creates an inherent incentive to undertreat and underutilize . . . .”).  For example, 
oncologists have expressed concern that ACOs will prematurely refer their cancer 
patients to a hospice program in lieu of specialty care that may produce better 
patient outcomes, but at a higher cost.  See Butcher, supra note 159, at 40 (2011) 
(discussing oncologists’ concerns about ACOs withholding appropriate care from 
cancer patients). 
 168  See David Mechanic, Cost Containment and the Quality of Medical Care: Rationing 
Strategies in an Era of Constrained Resources, 63 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 453, 463 
(1985) (stating that setting priorities under constrained budgets may result in the 
delay of initiation of a new technology, service or unit, reducing staff, closing beds, 
eliminating nonessential services, and constraining other major costs).  Cf. PHILIP 
BETBEZE, HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA INTELLIGENCE, REFORM’S IMPACT: STAFF AND SERVICE 
CUTS EXPECTED 10 (Dec. 2011), available at 
http://content.hcpro.com/pdf/content/274037.pdf (reporting that forty-three 
percent of respondents to a survey of health industry leaders stated that their facility 
will likely cut services as a result of implementation of the Affordable Care Act, and 
fifty-five percent stated that they will cut staff). 
 169  See Pelnar & Weiss, supra note 132, at 6 (stating that one purpose of quality 
measures is to prevent ACOs from under-treating patients); Eric C. Schneider et al., 
Payment Reform: Analysis of Models and Performance Measurement Implications, RAND 
CORP., 32, 38 (2011) (stating that a key role of performance measures in a global or 
share savings payment model is to ensure that quality does not decline and ACOs do 
not reduce care inappropriately as ACOs seek to reduce the cost of treating 
patients).  
 170  See 76 FED. REG. 67802, 6788990 (Nov. 2, 2011) (Table I listing thirty-three 
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at the thirtieth percentile or better on at least seventy percent of the 
quality measures.  In addition, ACOs exceeding the minimum 
threshold would be eligible for a larger proportion of any savings the 
ACO generates for the Medicare program.171  While holding ACOs 
financially accountable for their performance on selected quality 
measures certainly affords some protection against ACOs’ stinting on 
care,172 for the reasons discussed below, many patients will remain 
vulnerable.173 
The performance measures used to assess the quality of care 
provided by ACOs likely will be less comprehensive than necessary to 
protect against ACOs stinting on care.  The initial set of quality 
measures under the Medicare Shared Savings Program, for example, 
focuses on certain conditions and services,174 leaving important areas 
of clinical practice unaddressed, such as treatment for cancer, severe 
arthritis, or chronic pain.175  To be fair, CMS has stated that in the 
future it will select additional measures applicable to these and other 
domains of care.176 Currently available measures, however, largely 
focus on prevention and certain aspects of chronic care, and 
developing new measures that address the full range of services and 
clinical settings will take time.  In the short term, the absence of 
quality measures across all domains of care may leave some ACO 
patients vulnerable to under-treatment as ACOs strive to lower the 
cost of care.177 
 
performance measures adopted in the final rule). 
 171  See id. at 67897–98 (finalizing rule that ACOs perform at the thirtieth 
percentile or better on at least seventy percent of the quality measures). 
 172  See Mulvany, supra note 90, at 48 (stating that the ACO payment model 
“penalizes providers that stint on care solely to meet financial goals”); see Schneider 
et al., supra note 169, at 38 (2011) (stating that the role of performance measures 
under the ACO model is “to monitor the quality of care delivered by participants in 
the ACO and to ensure that quality does not decline as clinicians seek to reduce the 
cost of treating the ACO population”). 
 173  In an effort to achieve costs below applicable expenditure benchmarks and 
boost their performance on quality measures, ACOs also have an incentive to avoid 
high-risk patients who are less likely to be healthy and comply with their providers’ 
orders.  See Pelnar & Weiss, supra note 132, at 6 (stating that ACOs may avoid high 
risk patients in order to achieve high quality metric scores). 
 174  The performance measures in the final rule for the shared savings program 
include measures addressing diabetes, hypertension, heart disease, and chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD).  See 76 FED. REG. 67802, 67889–90 (Nov. 2, 
2011) (Table I listing thirty-three performance measures adopted in the final rule).   
 175  See id. 
 176  See id. at 67886 (stating that CMS will consider additional measures addressing 
cancer and other conditions in future rulemaking).  
 177  See Pelnar & Weiss, supra note 132, at 8 (stating that an ACO performing well 
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Even for those domains of care for which CMS selects quality 
performance measures, the measures may not adequately guard 
against diminished quality.  Most of the measures selected by CMS 
under the Shared Savings Program are process measures that 
evaluate the extent to which a provider delivers a specific clinical 
service at a specific point in time.178  Process measures, however, are 
unlikely to provide a complete picture of the quality of care ACOs 
provide to their patients.  First, because process measures are based 
on current treatment norms, process measures cannot be developed 
for the many areas of medicine lacking a strong scientific basis or 
consensus as to best practices.179  Second, process measures may be a 
crude measure of the quality of care provided to patients,180 as the 
selected process measures focus on discrete interventions and do not 
measure all processes of care that impact a patient’s health.181  In 
addition, process measures simply measure whether a procedure was 
performed and do not measure other attributes of care that may be 
important indicators of quality, such as a health care professional’s 
expertise or operator skill.182  Finally, process measures fail to 
measure what ultimately matterspatient health.183  To the extent the 
nexus between the measured process and a patient’s health is weak, 
evaluating whether an ACO performed a particular process may tell 
us little about whether the ACO’s clinical interventions improved 
 
on reported quality measures may not mean that it has not engaged in restricting or 
delaying care in ways not reflected in the quality measures); Butcher, supra note 159, 
at 40 (commenting that the absence of quality measures for cancer care may result in 
cancer patients being denied new, expensive drugs given ACOs’ financial pressures). 
 178  Examples of process measures selected by CMS for inclusion in the Shared 
Savings Program include screening for fall risk (measure 13), depression screening 
(measure 18), colorectal l cancer screening (measure 19), mammography screening 
(measure 20), and percentage of adults who had their blood pressure measured 
within the preceding 2 years (measure 21).  See 76 FED. REG. 67802, 67889–90 (listing 
quality measures adopted in final rule). 
 179  See Marshall Chin & Naoko Muramatsu, What is the Quality of Quality of Medicare 
Core Measures?: Rashomon-like Relativism and Real-World Applications, 46:1 PERSPECTIVES 
IN BIOLOGY AND MED. 5, 12 (2003) (stating that confusing, limited, or conflicting data 
often makes impossible the consensus necessary to develop process measures).   
 180  See id. at 12 (discussing the limitations of process measures). 
 181  See id. (noting that process measures capture elements of care but miss 
important outcomes). 
 182  See Jonathan Mant, Process versus Outcomes Indicators in the Assessment of Quality of 
Health Care, 13 INT’L J. FOR QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE 475, 478 (2001) (explaining that 
that process measures cannot capture important determinants of patient outcomes 
such as technical expertise and operator skill). 
 183  See Douglas L. Wood, Measure Health, Not Care, MINNESOTA MED. 2 (Apr. 2012) 
(stating that process measures do not address the health of an individual or 
population). 
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patient health.184 
Similarly, the patient experience measures included under the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program may fail to reveal problems with 
the quality of clinical care provided to ACO patients.  Patient surveys 
ask patients to report on their satisfaction with their care, their 
perceptions of the quality of care, and their perceptions of what 
specific care they received.185  Studies repeatedly have found that 
measures of patients’ general satisfaction fail to adequately 
discriminate among providers, with less than ten percent of the 
variance in patients’ responses attributable to differences in the care 
provided.186  While measures of specific patient experience appear to 
better discriminate among providers, most of the variance in 
responses is due to differences in patients’ perceptions and random 
error.187  Problems in the reliability and validity of patient satisfaction 
and experience measures reflect the fact that patient reports are 
subjective and subject to reporting biases.188  For example, research 
suggests that patient report measures are unreliable after a delay or 
more than six weeks and are more prone to error when patients must 
 
 184  As explained by one commentator, because process measures reflect current 
treatment norms, they are only as good as the clinical evidence underlying those 
norms. See Avedis Donabedian, THE DEFINITION OF QUALITY AND APPROACHES TO ITS 
ASSESSMENT 119 (1980) (“The major drawback in the use of process for the 
assessment of the quality of care is the weakness of the scientific basis for much of 
accepted practices.”).  Unfortunately, much uncertainty exists regarding the 
effectiveness of various clinical interventions.  See supra notes 13436 and 
accompanying text. 
 185  See Maxwell Drain & Paul Clark, Measuring Experience from the Patient’s 
Perspective: Implications for National Initiatives, JHG ONLINE W4–6, W4–6 (2004) 
(explaining the different types of information that can be obtained from patient 
surveys). 
 186  See Chris Salisbury et al., Patients’ Experience and Satisfaction in Primary Care: 
Secondary Analysis Using Multilevel Modeling, BMJ (Oct. 12, 2010), available at 
http://www.bmj.com/content/341/bmj.c5004 (discussing studies showing that 
measures of patients’ satisfaction discriminate poorly between practices, doctors, and 
hospitals, with random error and differences in patients’ perceptions accounting for 
9097%of the variance in patients’ responses). 
 187  See id. (reporting that 20.2 percent of the variance in wait for appointment 
outcome was due to differences between practices, with the remaining 79.1 percent 
attributable to differences in individual patients’ perceptions and random error); 
Mala Rao et al., Patients’ Own Assessments of Quality of Primary Care Compared with 
Objective Records Based Measures of Technical Quality of Care: Cross Sectional Study, BMJ 
(June 29, 2006), available at http://www.bmj.com/content/333/7557/19 (finding 
low correlation between patients assessments of their care and the evidence-based 
measures of clinical outcomes). 
 188  See Drain & Clark, supra note 185, at W4–7 (“[Patient] evaluations tend to be 
subjective, subject to reporting biases, and difficult to interpret . . . .”). 
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recall multiple instances of care.189  Consequently, scores on patient 
experience measures may not be reliable indicators of the quality of 
care patients receive. 
Recognizing these weaknesses in process and patient experience 
measures, CMS plans to add additional outcome measures to its 
selected quality measures.190  Whereas process measures focus on what 
care was actually provided to a patient, outcome measures assess what 
we ultimately care aboutthe patient’s health status.  That is, 
outcome measures assess the end result of clinical intervention,191 
such as morbidity rates, the severity of a patient’s chronic condition, 
and hospital re-admission rates.  In focusing on patient’s health, 
outcome measures better protect patients against poor quality care.  
In particular, longitudinal measures of changes in patients’ 
functional status, morbidity, and quality of life may guard against the 
risk of under-treatment, as such patient outcomes depend on the mix 
of services provided to patients over time.192 
Outcome measures, however, also are problematic.  Assessing 
whether an ACO provides high-quality care requires comparing the 
health status of an ACO’s patients to the patients of other providers.  
Disparities in observed patient outcomes across providers, however, 
may be due to chance rather than differences in the quality of care 
provided.  Consequently, the sample size of the measured data must 
be large enough to minimize the possibility that perceived differences 
in outcomes result from random variation, rather than differences in 
the quality of care.193  Statistical power also depends on the frequency 
 
 189  See id. at W4–8–9 (discussing problems with patient reports).   
 190  See 76 Fed. Reg. 67802, 67873. 
 191  See Willis et al., Measuring Quality, 31 AUSTRALIAN HEALTH REV. 276, 278 (2007) 
(discussing process and outcome quality measures). 
 192  See Schneider, supra note 169, at 40 (“Measurement of longitudinal changes in 
functional status and quality of life may be the most effective way to assess whether 
providers are optimally applying services within the ACO.”). 
 193  See Mant, supra note 182, at 478 (discussing the need to eliminate random 
variation as an explanation for observed differences in patient outcomes).  See also 
Schneider, supra note 169, at 12 (noting the need to obtain sufficient numbers of 
observations to estimate performance with a reasonable degree of confidence).  As 
one commentator illustrated: 
[T]o detect a 30% difference in outcome between two units 
performing carotid endarterectomy with 80% power at a significance 
level of 5%, with one unit achieving a 7% death and complication rate 
and another unit a 10% rate, would require the audit of 1422 carotid 
endarectomies in each unit.  Given that hospitals in New York State 
each performed an average of 50 carotid endarectomies a year in 1995, 
such a difference is unlikely to be detected. 
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with which the measured outcome occurs, with a larger sample size 
needed to detect small differences in quality.194  To the extent an 
ACO’s patient population is not large enough to ensure an adequate 
sample size, regulators will be unable to detect differences in the 
quality of care provided by an ACO and other providers, putting ACO 
patients at risk of under-treatment.195 
Measures of patient outcomes also do not necessarily correlate 
with the actual quality of care provided to patients, as numerous 
other factors external to treatment impact a patient’s health.196  Often 
these factors are largely outside the ACO’s control, such as the 
patient’s non-compliance with their physician’s instructions, lifestyle 
factors, poverty, and the strength of a patient’s social support 
system.197  In addition, evaluating clinical outcomes is complicated by 
the fact that the health status of patients treated for a particular 
condition depends not only on the quality of the care they receive, 
but also on whether they suffer other unrelated medical conditions.  
For example, the functional status of a stroke patient may be low not 
because they receive poor quality care following their stroke, but 
because of an unrelated intervening event affecting their health, such 
 
Mant, supra note 182, at 476. 
 194  See Mant, supra note 182, at 478.  For example, 
[s]ince the target complication rate in carotid endarectomy is low 
(6%), monitoring outcome will only have limited ability to detect 
whether an individual surgeon’s true complication rate is greater than 
6%.  For example, if a surgeon’s ‘true’ complication rate was 8%, one 
would need to monitor the outcome of 1200 operations to detect that 
this surgeon’s rate was greater than 6% with 80% power at a 
significance level of 5%.   
Id. 
 195  Because ACOs generally assume responsibility for a larger patient population 
than those cared for by a single hospital or physician group, for many measures an 
ACO’s patient population may be sufficiently large to ensure an adequate sample 
size.  See Schneider, supra note 169, at 35 (“Because the enrolled populations under 
the global payment and ACO shared savings program models will tend to be larger 
than those of a single hospital, group, or physician, it may be easier to obtain 
adequate sample sizes for performance measurement.”).  For some measures, 
however, this may not prove to be the case. 
 196  See Pelnar & Weiss, supra note 132, at 9 (“Outcome measures may not reflect 
actual quality of care delivered because they are influenced by many external 
variables . . . .”).  Data on patient outcomes for longer-term courses of treatment are 
especially prone to confounding factors given that they involve collecting data over 
longer time periods.  See Chin & Muramatsu, supra note 179, at 10 (“Longer-term 
courses will be more likely to capture ultimate health status, but are prone to 
confounding by other intervening events not related to the quality of care.”). 
 197  See Mant, supra note 182, at 476 (discussing factors other than health care that 
are determinants of health). 
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as a myocardial infarction.198  Although adjusting the data for 
variation in patient characteristics can reduce the possibility that 
observed differences in data are due to factors other than the quality 
of care (a process known as risk-adjustment), methodologies for 
doing so are often inconsistent and produce contradictory results.199  
For some domains of care, these challenges may render it impossible 
to develop statistically valid outcome measures that would detect true 
differences in the quality of care. 
A final concern regarding outcome measures is that the data 
used for measuring patient outcomes often is incomplete, inaccurate, 
or subject to manipulation by providers.200  Assessments of ACOs’ 
quality of care entail comparing their performance on quality 
measures to the performance of other providers.  To be a fair 
comparison, performance comparisons must take into account 
clinical, demographic, and other differences among providers’ 
patients that may affect patient outcomes (i.e., the performance 
measures must be risk adjusted).201  Accurate comparisons of 
providers’ performance, however, require complete data of sufficient 
clinical detail to allow for sophisticated risk adjustment.202  
Unfortunately, the needed patient data is often incomplete, lacks 
sufficient detail, or is inaccurate due to errors in diagnosis coding.203  
 
 198  See Chin & Muramatsu, supra note 180, at 10 (noting that unrelated 
myocardial infarction complicates measurement of a stroke patient’s health status). 
 199   For example, one study comparing the performance of four vendors 
performing risk-adjustment on the same patient data found that their risk-adjusted 
measurements of inpatient hospital mortality varied significantly, with forty-three 
percent of hospitals showing higher-than-expected mortality under one vendor’s 
method having lower-than-expected mortality under another’s methods.  See Peter 
Pronovost & Richard Lilford, A Road Map for Improving the Performance of Performance 
Measures, 30 HEALTH AFF. 569, 569 (2011) (discussing a study of vendors’ risk-
adjustment performance). 
 200  See id. at 570 (commenting that measures calculated using discharge data are 
often imprecise, as the risk for misclassification is high); Pelnar & Weiss, supra note 
132, at 9 (“The reliability of metrics for measuring the quality of care is also limited 
by the available data, which are likely to come from medical documentation or 
claims data.”). 
 201  See A.E. Powell et al., Using Routine Comparative Data to Assess the Quality of 
Health Care: Understanding and Avoiding Common Pitfalls, 12 QUALITY & SAFETY IN 
HEALTH CARE 121, 124 (2003) (“Performance comparisons between healthcare 
providers need to take into account whether the measures being compared derive 
from similar patient groups, . . . so retrospective risk adjustment is required.”). 
 202  See id. at 124 (explaining that sophisticated risk adjustment requires detailed 
information about which patients have certain characteristics).  
 203  See Ian Scott & Michael Ward, Public Reporting of Hospital Outcomes Based on 
Administrative Data: Risks and Opportunities, 184 MED. J.  OF AUSTRALIA 571 (2006) 
(noting that data used for quality assessment is “often inaccurate, incomplete, or 
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Comparing providers’ performance also can be hampered by 
differences in the way providers record patient data.  Specifically, 
researchers have found that when providers are subject to quality 
assessment, they often engage in “upstaging,” that is, changing how 
they record patient data so as to increase their patients’ risk profile.204  
To the extent ACOs engage in upstaging, this would lead to 
variations in quality scores that would be incorrectly attributed to 
variations in the quality of care, rather than differences in the 
recording of patient data.205 
These inherent limitations of performance measures mean that 
for many domains of care, regulators cannot monitor the quality of 
care provided by ACOs.206  So while tying an ACO’s payments to its 
performance on selected quality measures offers patients some 
protection against under-treatment, performance measures alone will 
not ensure that ACOs generate cost savings without stinting on 
care.207 
 
provide insufficient clinical detail, with accuracy of diagnosis coding variable); 
Powell, supra note 201, at 124 (the detailed information needed to conduct risk 
adjustment “is rarely routinely available” in part because “the data set is incomplete 
or inaccurate in certain aspects”); Welke et al., Chance, Bias, and Confounding: Threats 
to Valid Measurement of Quality in the Context of Pediatric Cardiac Surgery, PEDIATRIC 
CARDIAC SURGERY ANNUAL 81 (2010) (noting that often data used for quality 
assessment “lack the desired granularity”). 
 204  See Powell et al., supra note 201, at 124 (describing the problem of 
upstagingthe grading of patients over time shifting upwards, perhaps as providers 
give greater attention to the initial assessment of severity). 
 205  As explained by one group of authors: 
As the definitions of severity drift upward [due to changes in how 
patient data is recorded], the highest risk patients in one category are 
moved up to the next highest category where they are lower risk 
relative to the other patients in the group,  The highest risk patients 
from that group get moved up too, so each risk category loses some of 
its more severe cases and gains less severe cases.  The outcomes (for 
example, mortality and morbidity) for each risk category considered 
separately thus appear to improve as the “pool” of severity within them 
is diluted. 
Id. at 124.   
 206  See Rachel Werner & Robert McNutt, A New Strategy to Improve Quality: 
Rewarding Actions Rather Than Measures, 301 JAMA  1375, 1375 (2009) (“[Q]uality may 
be feasibly measured for only a narrow and discrete portion of clinical care.”). 
 207  See ROBERT BERENSON & RACHEL BURTON, URBAN INST., ACCOUNTABLE CARE 
ORGANIZATIONS IN MEDICARE AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR: A STATUS UPDATE 8 (Nov. 3, 
2011), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412438-Accountable-Care-
Organizations-in-Medicare-and-the-Private-Sector.pdf (“It is unclear whether quality 
measures currently are up to the tasks assigned to them, that is, to ensure that cost 
savings will not be achieved by stinting on care.”); Pelnar, supra note 132, at 6 (2011) 
(stating that ACO quality measures may not ensure quality care “because restricting 
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V. OVERSIGHT OF ACOS’ RATIONING OF CARE 
Although ACOs have the potential to produce cost savings 
without sacrificing the quality of care they provide patients, there 
clearly are limits to their potential to do so.  In the long-term, ACOs 
cannot solve the problem of rising health care costs unless they make 
compromises in the quality of care they provide to patients, including 
withholding potentially beneficial care from some patients.  In other 
words, we should recognize that ACOs must balance cost and quality 
considerations.  Of fundamental importance, then, is how to best 
ensure that ACOs balance cost and quality concerns in a manner that 
is both reasonable and equitable.  This Part concludes by briefly 
highlighting some issues health analysts and policymakers should 
consider in determining what regulatory oversight may be necessary 
to ensure that ACOs ration health care fairly. 
While in some cases limiting care on cost-benefit grounds may 
be justified, as discussed in Part III.D, the financial incentives under 
the ACO model could lead some providers to go too far, delaying or 
denying their patients appropriate care.  To guard against this risk of 
under-treatment, some may advocate for aggressive regulatory 
oversight of ACOs’ clinical decisions.  Before imposing potentially 
burdensome regulatory constraints on ACOs, however, we should 
assess whether the risk of under-treatment is significant enough to 
warrant a far-reaching regulatory response.  Specifically, we should 
examine whether certain factors temper the impact of ACOs’ 
financial incentives to stint on care, particularly at the level of the 
individual physician.  If so, a more moderate regulatory response to 
the risk of under-treatment of ACO patients may be called for. 
Although the financial incentives under the ACO model give 
ACOs an incentive to stint on patient care, various considerations 
may counteract such financial considerations.  Foremost among these 
factors is an ethics and culture among the medical profession which 
emphasizes fidelity to patients.  For example, the AMA ethical 
guidelines echo long-standing ethical principles requiring physicians 
to show fealty to their patients’ best interest over cost considerations, 
stating that “[w]hile physicians should be conscious of costs . . . , 
 
or delaying care may generate cost savings without triggering a decline on reported 
quality measures”); Ubl, supra note 167 (“[W]hile meeting quality measures may be a 
necessary condition for quality care, it is certainly not a sufficient condition.”).  For a 
more optimistic view of the potential for quality measures to guard against under-
treatment of ACO patients, see Zabawa et al., Adopting Accountable Care Through the 
Medicare Framework, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1471 (2012). 
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concern for the quality of care the patient receives should be the 
physician’s first consideration.”208  These professional medical ethics 
are inculcated in physicians during their medical education and 
training.  As explained by Ezekiel Emanuel and Victor Fuchs: 
Medical school education and postgraduate training 
emphasizes thoroughness. When evaluating a patient, 
students, interns, and residents are trained to identify and 
praised for and graded on enumerating all possible 
diagnoses and tests that would confirm or exclude them.  
The thought is that the more thorough the evaluation, the 
more intelligent the student or house officer.  Trainees who 
ignore the improbable “zebra” diagnoses are not deemed 
insightful.  In medical training, meticulousness, not 
effectiveness, is rewarded.209 
The physician culture further reinforces this training, with those 
physicians that are thorough and aggressivewho “do everything for 
the patient”held in high regard, while more prudent physicians 
risk being deemed incompetent.210  In addition, the American 
medical culture values physicians being on the cutting edge of their 
field, thereby encouraging use of the newest technologies and 
techniques.211  So although financial incentives will incentivize 
physicians to consider the cost of care provided to patients, 
professional values may deter physicians from stinting on medically 
appropriate care. 
Additional factors may further counteract ACOs’ financial 
incentives to undertreat their patients.  First, the fear of malpractice 
lawsuits may deter an ACO’s participating providers from denying 
their patients costly care that on balance is appropriate given its 
potential benefits.212  Competition among providers for patients 
provides a second, albeit modest, counter-pressure against under-
treatment.  ACOs may fear that should they develop a reputation for 
 
 208   AMA Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 2.09 (2011), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-
medical-ethics/opinion209.page?. 
 209  See Emanuel & Fuchs, supra note 60, at 2789–90. 
 210  See id.; see also Mashaw & Marmar, supra note 51, at 458 (stating that the 
American medical culture promotes aggressive intervention). 
 211  See Mashaw & Marmar, supra note 51, at 47677 (“Our medical culture 
inculcates the value of being at the cutting edge of one’s field, and that often entails 
the use of the newest and often the most expensive techniques.”). 
 212  See Mehlman, supra note 14, at 858 (“The fear of malpractice is probably the 
most effective pressure on providers to refrain from denying nonwasteful technology 
to patients.”). 
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providing low quality care, they may face declining demand for their 
services as patients seek alternative providers.213  Finally, informed 
consent rules reinforce the malpractice and competitive 
considerations that may deter ACO providers from stinting on care, 
particularly in those jurisdictions that require providers to inform 
patients of all available treatment options.  In a culture where 
patients expect to receive all potentially beneficial care, patients 
informed of alternative but costly treatment options denied them by 
their ACO understandably would be outraged.214  Fearing that these 
patients may file a malpractice claim or switch providers, ACO 
providers who under informed consent laws must disclose to patients 
alternative treatment options may hesitate to deny or delay such 
care.215  In sum, together these considerations may prove a powerful 
force in deterring ACO providers from delaying or denying their 
patients medically appropriate care. 
Despite these considerations, financial incentives likely will lead 
at least some ACO providers to provide subpar care.  Although tying 
an ACO’s payments to its performance on various quality standards 
affords patients some protection against under-treatment, additional 
safeguards may be necessary given the inherent limitations of 
performance measures, as discussed in Part III.D.  For example, some 
have advocated requiring an external appeals process that would 
allow ACO patients to obtain independent medical review of their 
physicians’ medical decisions (including a decision to deny or delay 
certain treatments).216  In addition, government regulators and 
 
 213  Although the difficulties faced by patients in evaluating the care they receive 
may limit their ability to make informed choices among providers, some providers 
nevertheless are motivated to provide high quality care in order to protect their 
reputations.  See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A 
DOSE OF COMPETITION 17 (2004) (stating that although there exists informational 
and payment barriers to effective competition, competition can play an important 
role in enhancing quality of care); Anne Frølich et al., A Behavioral Model of Clinician 
Responses to Incentives to Improve Quality, 80 HEALTH POL’Y 179, 187 (2007) (discussing 
a study of Wisconsin hospitals finding that public reporting of quality performance 
made hospitals more likely to adopt quality improvement programs); David Hyman, 
The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem 
or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, n.364 (2005) (stating that one motive 
of providers for improving quality may be concern for their reputation). 
 214  See Blustein & Marmor, supra note 135, at 1556 (stating that some patients 
would be outraged if denied potentially beneficial care). 
 215  See Mehlman, supra note 14, at 860 (“One aspect of malpractice law that may 
exert a particularly powerful pressure on providers to furnish patients with 
nonwasteful technology is the principle of informed consent.”). 
 216  See Myrl Weinberg, National Health Council Comments on CMS-1345-P, at 3 
(2001) (urging CMS to establish an appeals process for patients under the Medicare 
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independent monitors could review a random sample of ACO patient 
records to ensure that ACOs are not arbitrarily denying patients 
appropriate treatments.217 
In addition to protecting patients against under-treatment at the 
level of the individual patient, regulators should ensure that ACOs, at 
the organizational level, have sufficient resources to meet their 
patients’ needs.  As discussed in Part III.D, an ACO seeking to limit 
its costs may fail to maintain sufficient resources at the organizational 
level to meet the full range of patients’ needs.  To guard against poor 
resource-allocation decisions at the organizational level, regulators 
should consider whether to establish standards addressing ACOs’ 
capacity.  For example, federal and state regulators could establish 
standards intended to ensure that ACOs have a sufficient number of 
specialists among its physicians.  Where an ACO lacks the capacity to 
itself provide the full range of medical care, regulators should 
monitor whether such ACOs are denying or delaying referring 
patients to outside specialists and other providers who can meet the 
patients’ needs. 
Regulators also should consider whether to promulgate 
standards addressing ACO payment arrangements and assumption of 
financial risk.  For example, perhaps there should be limits on the 
extent to which individual practitioners participating in ACOs face 
financial risk for the cost of their individual treatment decisions, with 
participating physicians instead rewarded based on their economic 
performance as a group.  Indeed, in its proposed waivers for the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program, the Office of the Inspector 
General invited comments on the potential risk of underutilization 
raised from ACO physicians and other participants bearing risk for 
the cost of care they provide to ACO patients.218  Similarly, for those 
ACOs accepting capitation from private payors, regulatory review of 
agreed-upon rates may be necessary to ensure that ACOs receive 
sufficient revenue to meet their patients’ needs.  Regulators also 
should consider whether to establish financial solvency and cash 
reserve requirements for ACOs assuming financial risk in order to 
guard against financially-strapped ACOs stinting on patient care. 
 
Shared Savings Program). 
 217  See Ubl, supra note 167 (proposing that “independent monitors oversee the 
ACOs to protect against arbitrary ‘stinting’”).  In its final rule for the Shared Savings 
program, CMS stated that it will audit ACOs in order to ensure that patients receive 
appropriate care.  See 76 Fed. Reg. at 67967. 
 218   See 76 FED REG. 19655, 19660 (April 7, 2011) (inviting comments on the risk 
of underutilization and stinting).  
MANTEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2012  3:56 PM 
1440 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1393 
 
In addition to concerns regarding whether ACOs will 
appropriately balance cost and quality considerations, there is the 
additional concern that ACOs may not allocate care equitably among 
their patients, with some patients receiving higher quality care than 
others.  Numerous studies have documented racial, ethnic, and 
gender disparities in health care.  For example, a 2002 Institute of 
Medicine report found that racial and ethnic minorities often receive 
lower quality care relative to patients of European descent, disparities 
that cannot be explained by differences in insurance coverage, access 
to care, income, education, or patient preferences.219  Other studies 
have found that physicians often ignore or delay treating women’s 
symptoms.220  These disparities may reflect conscious and unconscious 
stereotyping and selective empathy that influence providers’ 
decisions.  For example, in making decisions regarding the most 
appropriate course of treatment, physicians take into account the 
likelihood that patients will comply with therapeutic 
recommendations, patients’ dietary practices, family and social 
support, living conditions, pain tolerance, and other factors.221  To 
the extent that a patient’s race, gender, or other characteristics bias a 
physician’s evaluation of these factors, there will be disparities in the 
quality of care provided.222  Financial incentives to reduce costs, such 
as those reflected in the ACO model, could further exacerbate these 
disparities.223 
 
 219  See COMM. ON UNDERSTANDING AND ELIMINATING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES 
IN HEALTH CARE, INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: WHAT HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS 
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (2002). 
 220  See Michelle Oberman & Margie Schaps, Women’s Health and Managed Care, 65 
TENN. L. REV. 555, 565 (1998) (discussing gender bias in physicians). 
 221  See Maxwell Gregg Bloche, Race and Discretion in American Medicine, 1 YALE J. OF 
HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 95, 101 (2001) (describing patient characteristics that 
influence physicians’ treatment decisions). 
 222  See id. at 104 (commenting that to the extent race-related preconceptions 
affect physicians’ expectations and suppositions, racial disparities in clinical 
judgment ensue).  See also Barbara Noah, Racial Disparities in the Delivery of Health Care, 
35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 135 (1998) (“Physicians’ treatment decisions may reflect 
unstated prejudices—negative or pessimistic assumptions about their African 
American patients’ family support networks, dietary practices, or adherence to 
recommended post-treatment care-regimens.”). 
 223  Cf. Sidney Watson, Race, Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequalities and Incentives, 
27 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 223 (stating that capitation creates special risks for minority 
patients).  With their emphasis on evidence-based rules for clinical decisions, to 
some extent ACOs may be able to counteract the bias that leads to deviations from 
appropriate care.  See Bloche, supra note 221, at 118 (“Incentives to adhere to 
evidence-based protocols . . .  [would] penalize race-related deviations.”).  However, 
gaps in the clinical science and variation among patients limits the extent to which 
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Should there be evidence of differential treatment among ACO 
patients, regulatory action to address such inequalities may be 
warranted.  For example, the set of quality measures used to evaluate 
ACOs’ performance could include measures that evaluate the care 
ACOs provide to vulnerable patient populations.224  In addition, 
regulators could require ACOs to monitor and address disparities in 
the provision of care to patients, and educate their professionals on 
how gender, race, cultural and other factors may influence their 
clinical judgment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although ACOs clearly have opportunities to achieve savings 
without adversely impacting patient care, this Article argues that 
those opportunities may be far fewer than policymakers hope.  In the 
long-term, ACOs cannot successfully dampen health care inflation 
unless we allow them to make some compromises in the quality of 
care they provide.  Moreover, even if ACOs potentially could 
sufficiently rein in costs while improving the quality of care, in 
practice ACOs have clear financial incentives to stint on the care they 
provide patients.  Policymakers and scholars therefore should not 
assume that ACOs will achieve savings without compromising the 
quality of care they provide to patients.  Instead, they should 
recognize that some ACO patients will receive lower quality care as 
ACOs seek to balance cost and quality considerations.  Of 
fundamental importance, then, is how to best ensure that ACOs 
balance cost and quality concerns in a manner that is both reasonable 
and equitable, issues that merit careful deliberation and robust 
debate.  This Article seeks to prompt discussion of these concerns as 
 
evidence-based rules can guide medical decision making, leaving many medical 
decisions matters of professional discretion.  See sources cited supra note 135 and 
accompanying text.  See also Bloche, supra note 221, at 101 (noting that the potential 
for detailed decision rules to restraint clinical discretion is limited by empirical 
uncertainty about medical interventions).  Moreover, even if ACOs could develop 
comprehensive evidence-based rules, the subjectivity and incompleteness in 
observing and interpreting patients’ clinical signs and symptoms allows for bias to 
effect the application of such rules.  See Bloche, supra note 221, at 10102 (“The 
scope of practitioners’ discretion is further widened by the subjectivity and inevitable 
incompleteness of clinical observation and interpretation. . . . [such that] [e]ven if 
we could craft a comprehensive set of evidence-based rules for clinical decision 
making, this subjectivity and incompleteness would make application of the rules a 
matter of considerable discretion for . . . the treating physician.”). 
 224  Cf. Watson, supra note 223, at 22324 (proposing that managed care 
organizations receive a bonus for reducing racial disparities in medical care, as 
measured by performance criteria). 
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our health care delivery system continues to move toward the ACO 
model. 
 
